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ABSTRACT
The objective of this dissertation is to introduce a theory of the stability of rewards,
justice evaluations and group cooperation with the results from three empirical tests of
the theory. According to justice theory, rewards from exchange relations produce justice
evaluations among individuals, leading to emotional and behavioral reactions.
Specifically, unjust rewards cause lower levels of justice evaluations, positive emotions,
and cooperative behaviors. Prospect theory and research on negativity bias posit the
asymmetry between negative and positive events: negative events have a stronger effect
than the same size of positive events on individuals’ perception. Combining the previous
arguments, the theory introduced in this dissertation maintains that in repeated rewards
events, the instability of rewards itself has a negative effect. That is, unstable rewards
lower justice evaluations, positive emotions, and willingness to cooperate.
The theory is tested with three mixed quantitative methodologies. Results from
analyses of nationally representative sample survey data show that the stability of rules in
workplaces has a positive effect on justice evaluations, willingness to work hard and
willingness to stay in current workplaces among employees. Next, a controlled laboratory
experiment tests the theory more rigorously. The results reveal the positive effect of the
stability of rewards on justice evaluations, positive emotions, and cooperative behaviors.
The second experiment replicates the results from the first experiment and confirms the
effectiveness of the theory. The experiment also tests the effect of the presenting order
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of instability of rewards and shows that reward instability occurring earlier has a stronger
effect than that which occurs later. The implications of findings on sociological theory
and other various areas are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
People frequently face situations where their efforts in groups yield unstable rewards. For
example, a referee in a sporting event can make bad calls. Some of these calls will be
advantageous to one team, while others will be advantageous to the other team, but the
calls will not be biased overall. Or in a company, an arbitrary boss can downplay an
employee’s performance at one time and praise it at another, even though the employee’s
performance is the same objectively in the two cases. In these situations, the outcome of
the baseball game or the employee’s reward may not be affected by this instability in
absolute terms since a disadvantageous event at one time can be canceled out by an
advantageous event at another time. However, this dissertation expects that the athletes
and the employee will perceive their situations as unjust. Even more, they may perceive
that the final allocation of rewards (the outcome of the game or the salary paid) is
unfavorable for them because the experience of under-reward is felt more keenly than the
experience of over-reward (e.g., Homans 1974).
In this dissertation, I explore the effects of reward stability on group cooperation
through justice evaluations and emotional reactions to rewards. Reward stability refers to
the extent to which repeated rewards stay invariant over time. If a series of rewards is
unstable, therefore, the level of its outcome fluctuates over time. Empirically, instability
of rewards is conflated with unfairness of rewards in many situations because unstable
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rewards frequently cause an unjust distribution of rewards. However, those two concepts
are clearly distinguishable theoretically. The former focuses on the invariability of
rewards in the time dimension, while the latter only considers the result of distribution at
a specific point in time. Instability of rewards does not necessarily result in injustice of
the outcomes in absolute terms; for example, if one incongruent reward is compensated
for by another incongruent reward. On the other hand, a series of stable rewards can be
unjust if they are invariably higher or lower over time than the just level of rewards
would be. A large volume of previous research has investigated the consequences of
injustice. But little of this has dealt with the effect of stability of rewards on human
reactions and behaviors.
To examine the net effect of stability of rewards on human behaviors, this
research brings together justice theories and elements from cognitive psychology. Justice
theory explains the various sources of justice evaluations and their emotional and
behavioral consequences (Jost and Kay 2010). Cognitive psychology, specifically
prospect theory and the concept of “negativity bias,” predicts individuals’ asymmetrical
responses to events with opposite valences and explains why negative events are
experienced more keenly than positive events. On the basis of combining these two lines
of research, the theory presented in this dissertation predicts that the stability of a reward
system has a positive effect on justice evaluations and emotional reactions, and
consequently on cooperation among group members in exchange relations. On the other
hand, rewards that are not stable but fluctuate between under-rewarding and overrewarding are predicted to reduce justice evaluations, positive emotions and cooperation
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among people. Based on this reasoning, as well as previous research, I have built a theory
about how the stability of rewards affects group cooperation.
In presenting this theory, I first review justice theory. The theory of distributive
justice has been developed since the 1960s. It is called equity theory since the researchers
were mostly interested in the equity distribution rule in work situations (e.g., Adams
1963). The theory examined how individuals perceive fairness in a situation and
suggested that an allocation is fair if its rewards correspond to people’s contributions to a
task (Adams 1965). The theory also explored the consequences of perceived fairness
among people. Considerable research has shown that perceived injustice causes
emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses among the reward recipients (e.g.,
Homans 1961; Walster et al. 1973).
Later research pointed out the limitations of existing equity theory and expanded
the theory. Scholars suggested the necessity of multidimensionality within the fairness
rule and maintained that people use equality or the need-based fairness rule as well as the
equity rule when they evaluate the fairness of a situation. Another line of research
revealed that justice evaluations are not made solely on the basis of comparisons of actual
rewards among proximate individuals, but also on the basis of comparisons between
actual rewards and their subjective reward expectation levels (e.g., Berger et al. 1977).
Researchers working on the theory also investigated the various sources that affect
people’s justice evaluations, and they consistently found that personal factors, e.g., status
or social-value orientations, and situational factors, e.g., power position or network,
affect justice evaluations. (See Hegtvedt 2006 for a recent review.) These studies show
that justice evaluations profoundly depend on subjective factors.
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On the subjectivity of justice evaluations, previous research has shown that the
effects of under-rewards on justice evaluations are stronger than the effects of the same
amount of over-rewards on justice evaluations (Austin and Walster 1974; Jasso 1978,
1980; Markovsky 1985). If there were no asymmetric effect of unjust rewards on justice
evaluations, one might expect that a lower level of reward (say, 10% less than expected)
could easily be canceled out by compensation at another time (10% more than expected).
However, assuming the effect is not the same, the sum of the justice evaluations made
about two unjust rewards in opposite directions with the same intensity should be lower
than the sum of the justice evaluations made about two just rewards. This suggests that if
the rewards are not stable but fluctuate between being higher and lower than an
individual’s expectation level over time, the instability itself can reduce people’s justice
evaluations.
In addition to justice theory, cognitive psychology also posits a general tendency
called “negativity bias” which shows how negative events have a stronger influence than
positive events on individuals’ perceptions in various human relationships (Baumeister et
al. 2001). Prospect theory also posits that gains below the reference point (under-rewards)
loom larger than corresponding gains above the reference point (over-rewards) because
people are loss averse (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991).
These findings provide the theory of reward stability presented in this dissertation with
the theoretical background necessary for explaining the asymmetric effects of unjust
rewards, and the effect of stability of rewards on justice evaluations. The current research
examines how repeated under- and over-rewards affect the justice process.
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The theory of procedural justice is deeply relevant to the role of stability of
rewards on justice perceptions over time. This theory argues that not only the results of
allocation, but the individuals’ experiences through the allocation process itself, affect
justice evaluations. Research on procedural justice reveals that people are more likely to
be satisfied with the results when the reward allocation process fulfills certain fairness
criteria. Those studies also suggest that the consistency rule is one of the criteria used to
evaluate the fairness of distribution procedure, and they show the role of stability of
procedure in justice procedures with extensive empirical evidence (Leventhal 1980).
However, this argument does not offer any explanation for how the inconsistency of rules
affects justice evaluations.
Lastly, in regards to the consequences of justice evaluations, a great deal of
research shows that perceived injustice causes emotional distress among individuals. The
research also reveals that individuals use cognitive and behavioral reactions to reduce the
distress that results from unfairness. Equity theorists predict that unjustly rewarded
employees will change their contribution to or their rewards from the company, either
actually or conceptually, in order to restore equity. It is also expected that they may quit
their relationships with the group. More recent research shows that unfair company
decisions cause employees to try to dissolve the relationship between themselves and
their organizations through such methods as leaving the company, calling in sick, coming
to work late, or pursuing their own interests (VanYperen et al. 2000).
On the basis of previous research, this dissertation develops a theory about the
effect of rewards stability on group cooperation. The theory assumes that among repeated
rewards over time, under-reward at one particular time cannot be fully compensated for
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by the same amount of over-reward at another time; whereas over-reward at one
particular time can be canceled out by smaller under-reward at another time. Through this
mechanism, the instability of a reward system has a negative effect on justice evaluations.
This theory also holds that the decreased justice evaluations can produce emotional
distress, which in turn reduces cooperation among group members. Consistent with this
argument, prior research on justice evaluations shows the causal relation between
evaluated (in)justice and emotional, cognitive and behavioral reactions (Hegtvedt 2006).
To this end, this research considers fluctuation of rewards through time as an
important factor in shaping justice evaluations. Although many studies have investigated
the antecedents and consequences of the justice process, researchers have not taken into
account the history of repeated rewards in examining the principles of justice evaluations.
Instead, most studies on distributive justice have treated an individual’s investments into
a group and rewards from the group as a single event, and focused on the results of the
allocation of rewards. Therefore, they have not accounted for reward stability. Since most
relationships in human society are embedded in a lager social context and last for a while
(Granovetter 1985), it is necessary to examine justice evaluations in the dimension of
time.
In exchange relations in human society, however, transactions do not occur just
once; on the contrary, people mostly belong to groups, contribute their resources to those
groups, and get rewards repeatedly over time (Greenberg and Scott 1996; Wayne et al.
1997). Justice evaluations, therefore, should not be viewed as independent from one
another but rather as highly contingent upon each other. For this reason, it is necessary
for justice theories to consider rewards as repeated events (Cosier and Dalton 1983).
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Based on this fact, the theory states that an unstable reward system affects group
cooperation through justice evaluations and concomitant emotional reactions. More
specifically, this study proposes that greater stability in the reward system will (i)
enhance justice evaluations by group members, (ii) arouse more positive emotional
reactions toward the rewards, and consequently (iii) increase members’ cooperation
within the group.
To evaluate this theory empirically, I use mixed quantitative methodologies. In
the first study, I analyze secondary data from the 2009 Korean General Social Survey
(KGSS). This is an analysis of the relationship between stability of rewards and group
cooperation. Though this study does not rigorously test the theory of this dissertation,
nationally representative survey data show that stability of rules in an organization will
affect members’ evaluations of rewards from the group; the stability of reward principles
in an organization is thus positively related to group commitment.
In the second study, a controlled laboratory experiment tests the theoretical
arguments more rigorously. The experiment manipulates the stability of rewards at three
levels and measures both subsequent justice evaluations of the rewards and emotional
reactions to them. Finally, cooperation levels are measured as behavioral consequences.
Multi-level analysis reveals that the stability of rewards is positively related to justice
evaluations, positive emotional reactions, and group cooperation. The results also
confirm the asymmetrical effect of unjust rewards more directly: the influence of underrewards is greater than that of over-rewards of the same size.
For the third empirical study, another controlled laboratory experiment is
performed to replicate the results of the experiment in the previous chapter and see how
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serial positioning or sequencing effects justice evaluations among group members (Lilly
et al. 2010). Specifically, this study manipulates the order of reward instability in four
ways (stable or unstable reward first × under-reward or over-reward first) and tests the
effect of the manipulation on justice evaluations, emotional reactions, and levels of group
cooperation. This experiment shows how sequencing and appearance patterns of unstable
rewards affect justice evaluation and its consequences.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2, I review the
literature that serves as a background for developing the central theory of this research.
Based on this background, in chapter 3, I present the theory of reward stability, justice
evaluations and group cooperation. I describe the causal relationship between the stability
of rewards and group cooperation via justice evaluation and emotional reactions.
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 comprise empirical studies which test the theory that is developed in
chapter 3. In chapter 4, I analyze secondary survey data set to test how the stability of
organizational rules over time affects employees’ commitment level at work. In chapter
5, a controlled laboratory experiment tests the theory more rigorously and shows the
effect of stability of rewards on justice evaluations, emotional distress and group
cooperation. Chapter 6 introduces an additional laboratory experiment that examines the
effect of unstable rewards in different presentation orders. In the last chapter, I pull
together the results of the empirical analysis and address the implications of this study for
academic areas and its applicability to practical areas.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In this chapter, I review the theoretical background central to this dissertation. Individuals
in cooperative relations are sensitive to the rewards they receive from the cooperation.
The key factor in motivating individuals to participate in cooperative relations is their
perception of the rewards they will receive from cooperating in comparison with the
contributions they will make to the cooperative relation. People cooperate when they
expect to receive greater profit from doing so than from pursuing the same endeavor
individually. If cooperation is not viewed as profitable enough for group members, they
are reluctant to cooperate.
This dissertation is based on theories of distributive and procedural justice, and on
prospect theory. Distributive justice focuses on the processes through which individuals
make justice evaluations based on reward allocations, and on the consequences of justice
evaluations, while procedural justice investigates the consequences of variations in the
rules regulating reward allocations (e.g., Clay-Warner et al. 2005). Negativity bias and
prospect theory show the asymmetry of effects between gains and losses (e.g., Kahneman
et al. 1991). Research on asymmetries suggests that if over-rewards can be regarded as
gains while under-rewards can be regarded as losses in justice processes, justice
evaluations can be biased toward injustice based on the asymmetry. The last part of this
chapter revisits justice theory to examine the consequences of justice evaluations on
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group cooperation. The effects of justice evaluations are extensive in that they cause
emotional, behavioral, and cognitive reactions.

2.1. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Distributive justice theory (Hegtvedt and Cook 2001) focuses on the “fairness in the
distribution of a set of outcomes to a defined circle of recipients” (Clay-Warner et al.
2005, p 90). Research on distributive justice has investigated the antecedents and the
consequences of justice evaluations among people. (For reviews, see Bierhoff et al. 1986;
Cook and Hegtvedt 1983; Hegtvedt 2006; Hegtvedt and Markovsky 1995.) In
investigating how people produce justice evaluations in given situations, researchers of
early distributive theory set down the equity rule as a criterion of fairness evaluation.
According to this rule, individuals evaluate an allocation as fair when people are
rewarded in accordance with their contributions to the group, which includes things such
as time, effort, and indirect contributions such as educational achievements and seniority.
The extensions to the theory look for factors other than objective reward levels
that affect justice evaluations. A good deal of research shows that personal factors such
as status (Berger et al. 2002) affect individuals’ justice evaluations. On the other hand,
situational factors such as the presence of an anchor (Markovsky 1988a), a power
position (Hegtvedt 1990; Hegtvedt et al. 1993) or a comparison network (Melamed et al.
2014) have been pointed to as important elements that importantly affect justice
evaluations. Another line of research suggests multi-dimensionality in distribution rules
(Deutsch 1985; Lerner 1977; Leventhal 1980). Distribution rules specify criteria for
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allocating rewards among individuals in a social system (Cook 1975; Markovsky 1985).
Individuals produce justice evaluations based on the distribution rule suitable for the
situation (e.g., equity, equality, or needs-based). Researchers argue that justice
evaluations will vary with the distribution rules which are applied to the situations. For
instant, justice evaluations based on equal distribution of outcomes across group
members will be different from justice evaluations based on the rule which stresses more
outcomes for group members with more needs. Regarding the results of justice process,
the research shows that perceived inequality leads individuals to emotional distress, and it
also reveals that they engage in further cognitive and behavioral reactions to get rid of the
uncomfortable feelings.

2.1.1 Equity Theory and the Proportionality Rule
In the 1960s, Adams (1963, 1965) first developed modern distributive justice
theory. Adams’ theory is also called equity theory because it suggests that equity is a
main rule for evaluating fairness of reward allocation.1 According to the equity rule, an
individual should get rewards or burdens from the group based on his/her input or
contributions to the group. Equity theory assumes that people evaluate a situation to be
fair when an individual who contributes more to the group’s performance gets more
rewards from the group. The equity rule is most salient in work situations where
productivity or efficiency is a central concern. Based on the equity rule, the theory posits
proportionality of rewards as a general principle in evaluating the justice of rewards in
1

Leventhal (1980) pointed out that, in everyday language, “equity” is used in a broad
sense and encompasses a whole different type of justice rule. However, justice theorists
use the term in narrow a sense and defined “equity” as a merit- or contribution-based
allocation of resources. In this dissertation, “equity” is used in the narrow sense.
11

exchange relations (Adams 1965). According to the proportionality principle, a situation
is equitable (or just) when the investment-to-reward ratio for one person is equal to the
investment-to-reward ratio for another person, whereas inequity (or injustice) occurs
when the ratios of investments to rewards are not identical between two actors.
Distributive justice theory also investigates how individuals respond to perceived
injustice in emotional, cognitive, and behavioral ways. Emotionally, perceived injustice
arouses distress among the individuals in the group (see Turner 2007 for a review). The
distributive justice theory states that there is a positive relationship between the perceived
intensity of the injustice and the emotional distress of the individual; the distress
increases as the perceived injustice becomes more severe (Homans 1974). Distributive
justice research also discovered that not only under-reward but also over-reward causes
emotional distress among its recipients (Anderson et al. 1969; Walster et al. 1973). That
is, individuals feel bad about results where their own rewards are higher than the
expected level, as well as when their rewards are lower than the expected level. The type
of emotions produced by over-reward and under-reward are not the same, however. In
terms of types of emotions, when individuals face unfair rewards it mainly causes anger,
disappointment, and ingratitude, while over-rewards mainly causes guilt and feeling of
indebtedness (Adams 1963; Homans 1961; Leventhal et al. 1969; Walster et al. 1973).
Importantly for the current study, Adams pointed out that under-reward causes
greater emotional reaction than over-reward (Adams 1963). Based on the evidence from
Adams’ studies, Homans held that under-rewarded individuals are much more likely to
claim injustice than are over-rewarded individuals (Homans 1974). Austin and Walster
(1974) also performed an experiment to examine the effect of inequity on levels of
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contentment. The research showed that the contentment level was higher when the
subjects were fairly rewarded than when they were unfairly rewarded. They are more
content and less stressed when they are over-rewarded than when they are underrewarded.
Another major contribution of equity theory is the finding that the effects of
perceived injustice are not limited to emotional reactions, but extend to cognitive and
behavioral responses. Adams (1963) argued that facing unjust rewards, individuals will
suffer from discomfort. Following dissonance theory (Festinger 1954), he also
maintained that the individuals will change their investments and/or rewards in either
behavioral or cognitive ways to eliminate the distress. Through these changes, individuals
can restore equity to their relationships in which they contribute resources to get rewards.
If inequity is not reduced by behavioral or cognitive means, the actor is more likely to
leave the relationship. Put differently, if inequity remains, the individual become less
committed to the relationship (This will be discussed in more detail later).

2.1.2 Extension of Equity Theory and Distributive Justice
Though the early distributive justice theory (equity theory) suggested equity as a
reward allocation rule and explained its applications, the theory was applicable only to
quite restricted situations because it assumed that individuals evaluate the fairness of their
rewards only in term of their contributions to the outcomes (e.g., Leventhal 1980). Equity
theory was, therefore, pertinent to locally isolated economic exchanges such as
workplace situations. The theory was difficult to use in explaining justice processes in
situations where the equity rule is not salient or where local comparison is not applicable.
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One limitation of the equity theory is that it addresses uni-dimensionality of
justice evaluation rules (Cook and Hegtvedt 1983; Deutsch 1985; Komorita and
Chertkoff 1973; Lerner 1974). Equity theory posits that individuals evaluate the fairness
of their rewards based only on the equity distribution rule. However, many studies
pointed out that equity is only one rule that may be used to evaluate the fairness of
various situations. Walzer (1983) argued that there are various spheres in the real world
and those different spheres need different criteria of justice evaluations. For example,
friends prefer equal distributions (see Cook and Hegtvedt 1983 for a review).
To explain the justice process in various situations, researchers introduced the
multi-dimensional model. They classified the rules for justice evaluations into three
concepts: equity, equality, and need; and they maintained that each rule is directed
toward different objectives. Specifically, equity rule stresses on contributions. Therefore,
if equity is used for justice evaluations, the recipient will focus on the ratios between
contributions and rewards among people. The equity rule is more likely applied when
group members try to promote productivity in their groups. Therefore it is more relevant
to workplace settings than to other situations. The equality rule, which is different from
equity, focuses on rewards that are distributed identically among recipients. Equality is
relevant to groups who try to enhance harmony among members. The third distribution
rule is based on needs, which justifies greater rewards to people facing greater
necessities, such as giving tax credits to people with many children or taking affirmative
action to promote the opportunities of minorities in a society. The needs-based rule is
supposed to attend to the welfare of members of the group (Deutsch 1985).
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Justice evaluations, even those in the same situation, should not be the same
across individuals if each of them gives different weight to different justice rules. Justice
judgment theory argued that individuals combine multiple rules when they evaluate
fairness of a situation2 (Leventhal 1980). Since each individual may view the same
situation differently from how others view it, justice evaluations of rewards from the
situation should vary across individuals. For example, the justice evaluations of a person
who is most concerned with the efficiency of the group should be different from those of
a person who places greater stress on the harmony of the group, because the former
places more value on the equity rule while the latter places more value on equality. The
multi-dimensionality of justice evaluation rules presents the possibility that justice
evaluations can be affected by the subjective application of justice evaluation rules.
Another identified weakness of equity theory is that it relies solely on a local
comparison (Berger et al. 1972a; Berger et al. 1972b). Equity theory assumes that people
produce justice evaluations based on comparisons of the ratios between contributions and
rewards with proximate others. A just distribution is then achieved when the ratios
between contributions and rewards are the same across all recipients. For instance, if a
colleague whose performance is the same as mine is paid $10/hr, I would have to be paid
$10/hr to evaluate the reward as fair. If I were paid $8/hr or $11/hr instead of $10/hr, I
would perceive the situation to be unfair. Under this formulation neither recipient can

2

Leventhal suggested the rule-combination equation as,
Deserved Outcome = wcDby contributions + wnDby needs + weDby equality + woDby other rules

where, w is a weight, D is deservingness, wc, wn, we, and wo are the weights on the rules
for contributions, needs-based, and equality, and any other aspects, respectively
(Leventhal 1980, p. 30).
15

make correct justice evaluations because the ratios between the contributions and the
rewards are congruent between two people even if both of the recipients are unjustly
rewarded. If two actors are under-rewarded to the same extent (e.g., if both get $8/hr in
the above illustration), both of them will perceive that their rewards are just according to
equity theory, despite a collective state of injustice. Furthermore, a slightly underrewarded individual may perceive herself to be over-rewarded if she compares her reward
with more severely under-rewarded colleagues (e.g., if one is paid $9/hr while other is
paid $8/hr) (Zelditch et al. 1970).
Berger and this colleagues also pointed out that equity theory cannot grasp the
effect of status in reward distributions and showed how status shapes performance
expectations in working groups (Berger et al. 1977). Equity theory explains unequal
distributions of rewards in terms of quality and quantity of contributions to group tasks.
According to this theory, therefore, not only the effort or time that a person puts directly
into the group, but also things such as status characteristics (e.g., education level or
seniority) can be regarded as investments that lead to higher rewards. However, this
theory cannot explain the effects of ascribed statuses such as age, race, ethnicity, and
gender, on unequal rewards since those status characteristics cannot be achieved by
individuals’ efforts.
To overcome those limitations, the status value theory of distributive justice
proposed a referential comparison (Anderson et al. 1969; Zelditch et al. 1970). The
theory explained how differences in status characteristics shape patterns of reward
distributions via reward expectations. In the referential comparison, individuals formulate
reward expectations which is defined as beliefs about their own rewards from socially
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validated expectations for rewards for people “like me” (Berger et al. 1972b). Based on
referential information about associations between states of status characteristics and
reward levels, individuals each develop their own concepts of deserved reward levels
based on their own status. If an individual’s own reward is lower than the socially shared
expectation, that individual will perceive him/herself to be under-rewarded, whereas if
the reward is higher than the socially acceptable expectation, the individual will perceive
him/herself to be over-rewarded. The theory shows the role of reward expectations
resulting from an association between status and an unequal distribution of rewards in a
group over time.
In sum, distributive justice theory explains the justice evaluation process and the
consequences of justice evaluations. Early distributive justice theory suggested the equity
rule and showed emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses arising from justice
evaluations among recipients. Researchers extended distributive justice theory by
overcoming the limitations of equity theory. In so doing, they provided the multidimensional justice evaluations rule and the idea of referential comparisons. This line of
development suggests that the feeling of (in)justice is not the product of a comparison
between actual and objectively just rewards, but a product of a comparison between
actual and subjectively expected rewards. In more recent justice theory, therefore,
injustice is defined as incongruence between the actual and the expected reward level, not
as incongruence between the actual and objectively fair reward (Cook 1975; Jasso 1980;
Markovsky 1985). Thus, an objectively fair allocation may not appear to be fair from a
subjective point of view (Hegtvedt et al. 2003). In the next section I will discuss the role
of subjectivity in justice evaluations more deeply.
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2.2. JUDGMENTAL BIAS AND ASYMMETRY

The previous section reviewed distributive justice theory, focusing on equity
theory and the ways in which the subjective aspects of justice evaluations become
important in justice theory. As was discussed earlier, justice evaluations are influenced by
many subjective factors, such as the justice rules each individual uses to evaluate a
situation, or the expectation level produced from referential comparisons. Research has
also found that the effects of unjust rewards on justice evaluations are unbalanced and
that under-rewards are more powerful than over-rewards of the same magnitude (e.g.,
Austin and Walster 1974). Following this line of reasoning, this dissertation examines the
asymmetric effects of under-rewards and over-rewards on justice evaluations in repeated
reward events.
Generally, the asymmetric effect is that evaluations of differences between two
objects are affected by the reference point (Vogelaar and Vermunt 1991). In other words,
people pay more attention to an event below the reference point than to an event above
the reference point. Applied to justice theory, this finding explains how under-rewards
come to have a stronger effect than the same sized over-rewards on individuals’
perceptions. This asymmetry between the effects of unjust rewards in opposite directions
is, however, not predicted only by justice theories. A line of study in cognitive
psychology found judgmental bias in a wide range of human behaviors, and provides a
theoretical argument explaining the asymmetry of justice evaluations.
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Tversky and Kahneman developed prospect theory, which holds that gains below
the reference point (under-rewards) loom larger than corresponding gains above the
reference point (over-rewards) because people are loss averse (Kahneman et al. 1991;
Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1984). Their experiments showed that in an exchange
relation, each bargaining party places more value on what they currently possess than on
a target utility that would replace their current possessions. In one experiment,
participants were randomly assigned to be sellers or buyers of a mug. The experimenter
asked each seller to decide the minimum price at which he/she would sell the mug, and
also asked each buyer to decide the maximum payment he/she would buy the mug. On
average, the buyers were willing to pay at most $2.87, while the sellers would not give up
the same mug for less than $7.12 (Kahneman et al. 1990). The researchers explained that
the disparity occurred because the individuals overestimated the losses they would suffer
in the exchange, as compared to their prospective gains (Carmon et al. 2003; Dhar and
Simonson 1992; Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In other words, the loss from the
exchange looms larger than the gain.
Researchers have found a general tendency towards perceptions of asymmetric
events, called negativity bias (Baumeister et al. 2001). With this bias, people pay more
attention to negative entities than positive entities in various types of human relations.
Rozin and Royzman (2001) maintained that negativity bias is manifested in four more
specific types of biases. Negative potency is the tendency to perceive a negative event as
being more potent subjectively and therefore more salient than its positive counterpart.
The greater steepness of negative gradients shows that the marginal effects of negative
events grow faster than the marginal effects of equivalent positive events. Negativity
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dominance states that the overall evaluation of integrated negative and positive events is
more negative than the sum of the subjective values of all the events. Lastly, greater
negative differentiation posits that negative entities yield more sophisticated and
elaborate perceptual differentiation than positive entities. This extensive review of the
negativity bias also revealed that it occurs in a wide range of human behaviors.
The asymmetry between under-reward and over-reward has not drawn much
attention from justice theorists as a main topic in the justice evaluation process. However,
this phenomenon has long been noticed by justice researchers (Adams 1963; Austin and
Walster 1974; Jasso 1980; Markovsky 1985). Researchers have argued that under-reward
has a stronger effect than the same amount of over-reward on justice evaluations. If there
are two actors, A and B, in an exchange relation, and one (A) is over-rewarded and the
other (B) is under-rewarded at the same intensity, B’s justice evaluation level will be
lower than A’s (Adams 1965; Homans 1974). Although justice researchers have argued
theoretically for this asymmetry, very little empirical evidence of it has been reported.
Walster and colleagues (1973) performed a laboratory experiment and showed that the
level of perceived fairness is highest among people who are rewarded at the expected
level. Moreover, in comparisons between different unjust situations, justice evaluations
are higher in the over-reward situation than in the under-reward situation when the
intensity of the injustice is the same. Jasso (1980) formulized the asymmetry using survey
data (Jasso and Rossi 1977). She postulated that the effect of injustice perceptions on
justice evaluations is logarithmic: the effect of under-rewards gets stronger as the
disparity becomes more severe, while the effect of over-reward lessens when the
disparity becomes more severe (Jasso 1980). In subsequent research, Markovsky (1985)
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confirmed the logarithmic function of the effects of unjust reward with a controlled lab
experiment.
Regarding the source of the asymmetry in the justice process, research suggests
that it arises because of individuals’ mixed motivations in justice evaluation situations.
That is, individuals are strongly concerned with the fairness of a given situation and try to
achieve fairness in the situations that they face (Lerner 1977). Therefore, as stated earlier,
when individuals experience unfairness, they feel uncomfortable and try to restore justice
to the situation. However, justice theory also assumes that individuals in relations try to
maximize their profits in relationships, and that the self-interest motivation is a powerful
determinant of human behavior (Miller 1999; Walster et al. 1973). For this reason, when
individuals are under-rewarded, the negative perception caused by the self-interest
motivation strengthens the negative perception caused by the fairness concern, and
intensifies the effect of the unjust reward. On the other hand, when individuals are faced
with over-rewarded, the self-interest motivation cancels out (a portion of) the perception
of injustice produced by the fairness consideration. Adams observed that “the threshold
would be higher presumably in [the] case of over-reward, for a certain amount of
incongruity in this case can be acceptably rationalized as ‘good fortune’ without attendant
discomfort” (Adams 1965, p.282). Van den Bos and his colleagues (1997) showed that
when overpaid, people experience a conflict between the fairness motivation (feeling
guilty) and the egocentric motivation (preference for the rewards), and that those mixed
motivations lead them to moderate levels of satisfaction regarding their rewards. Van
Prooijen and his associates (2008) investigated the effects of social value orientation
(SVO) and fairness-based responses to procedural justice. The results from their
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experiments and a field study reveal that individuals with pro-self orientations are more
affected by procedural justice than individuals with pro-social orientation. This research
shows how egocentric motivation affects justice evaluations.
Previous justice research has not examined the asymmetric effect in sequential
rewards over time (Cosier and Dalton 1983). Due to this limitation, the existing research
does not address the asymmetric effect of unjust rewards over time, and assumes that
only the final states of reward allocations are used to evaluate the fairness of a situation.
To overcome this problem, this dissertation assumes that the sum of justice evaluations of
each reward event will not be the same as the justice evaluations of the aggregate reward.
In testing this assumption, I examine the causal effects of unstable reward systems on
justice evaluations through time.

2.3. PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

Although this study is based distributive justice theory, procedural justice also provides
the current study with several useful implications. The research shows that justice
evaluations of procedural aspects also affect people’s emotional and behavioral responses
to their group. Procedural justice points out the limitations of the outcome-centered
model of distributive justice, which assumes that individuals are motivated solely by
concern for receiving favorable outcomes from their group. In contrast to this approach,
research on procedural justice maintains that individuals also care about the fairness of
the procedures by which outcomes are allocated and decisions are made when they
evaluate the fairness of authorities (Tyler 2010). Importantly to this dissertation,
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procedural justice shows that justice evaluations are not made entirely on the basis of the
distribution, but are also affected by individuals’ experiences during the allocation
process.
Thibaut and Walker (1975) were the first scholars to demonstrate that the fairness
of a decision-making procedure affects people’s satisfaction level with legal authorities
independently of the favorability or fairness of the outcomes it produces. They assumed
that people value having some control over the decision-making process because they
expect that their control of the process will bring them favorable results In multiple
laboratory experiments, the researchers tried to find situations in which disputants were
most likely to be satisfied with the results of conflict resolutions involving third-party
intervention (Thibaut and Walker 1978; Thibaut et al. 1974). Their results showed that
people are more satisfied with a result when the process that generates it includes their
voices or choices in the decision-making process, even if the result itself is opposed to
their interests. On the other hand, disputants’ satisfaction levels are the lowest when both
the decision-making process and the decision itself are fully controlled by the third party.
This model is called the instrumental model because procedural justice serves as
an instrument that ensures fair or favorable outcomes for the reward recipients (van
Prooijen et al. 2008). The instrumental model of procedural justice enriches justice theory
by showing that not only the outcomes of allocations, but also experiences throughout the
allocation process, influence people’s justice evaluations. However, this theory does not
consider the long-term relationships between allocators and recipients of rewards. Rather,
this model only considers one allocation occasion and does not take into account
repeatedly occurring reward situations over time (Tyler 1989).
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Tyler and Lind developed the group-value model of procedural justice which
focuses more on non-instrumental motivation in justice evaluations. The group-value
model explains that people pursue procedural justice not for instrumental reasons, but
based on symbolic and psychological mechanisms (Lind and Tyler 1988; Tyler 1989).
This model assumes that people look to group membership for their long-term social
relations because it provides them with self-identity. Individuals value fairness in the
decision-making process because the way they are treated by their group shows how
much they are valued and respected by that group. Lind and Tyler suggested three aspects
of procedures – the neutrality of the decision-making procedure, trust in the decisionmaking authority, and the information about individuals’ standings in the group as the
criteria of procedural justice and confirmed the effectiveness of these criteria with an
experiment.3
Researchers consistently found that when individuals perceive that they are
treated with fairness in decision-making procedures by authorities, they are more likely to
comply or cooperate with the authorities in various settings (Sunshine and Tyler 2003;
Tyler 2010). In recent years, research has also shown the effects of procedural justice on
emotions such as happiness, disappointment, anger, and frustration, etc. (Krehbiel and
Cropanzano 2000). However, this model does not focus on the variability of rewards over
time.

3

To investigate the effect of reward stability, this dissertation includes controlled
laboratory experiments in which reward allocation procedures are equated by design. In
the experiments, the procedures may be perceived by the subjects as unjust in terms of
Tyler and Lind’s three aspects, but those affect all conditions the same and hence issues
of procedure are controlled by design. See Chapter 5.
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Leventhal (1980) proposed six rules by which individuals can evaluate the
fairness of procedures: consistency, bias suppression, accuracy, contractibility,
representativeness, and ethicality. Among these, the consistency rule is most closely
related to the present research. The consistency rule states that the allocation process
should be consistent across actors and times. Consistency across actors requires that a
similar allocation rule should be applied regardless of the recipient and it should not be
more advantageous to some people than to others. Consistency across times dictates that
an allocation rule should be stable over time. Based on previous studies, Leventhal
predicted that violation of the consistency rule would harm procedural justice
evaluations, and a few recent studies provide empirical evidences that consistent
application of standards is indeed one of the factors for evaluating procedural justice
(Barrett-Howard and Tyler 1986; Greenberg 1986). However, these studies are rare, and
most of them do not distinguish consistency across times from consistency across
recipients (Folger and Konovsky 1989), or else they lean more toward consistency across
actors than consistency over time (Folger and Bies 1989; Niehoff and Moorman 1993).
Procedural justice research widened the horizon of justice theory by moving its
focus from reward allocation results to the ways in which the results were arrived at
(Cropanzano and Folger 1989). Introducing the concept of a consistency rule, this
research has started to consider time in justice evaluations. However, procedural justice
research differs from the current study on some points. First, although it suggests the
concept of consistency as one criterion for procedural justice evaluations, only a handful
of studies have empirically tested the effectiveness of consistency so far. Secondly, the
empirical research examining the impact of consistency has only focused on consistency
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across actors (e.g., employees). Therefore, the effects of fluctuations of allocation rules
through time have not been tested rigorously. More importantly, while procedural justice
investigates the factors that regulate the distribution of rewards, the current study tries to
explain how instability in the distribution of rewards affects justice perceptions.
Procedural justice examines the influence of procedures independently of their outcomes
for justice evaluations.

2.4. CONSEQUENCES OF JUSTICE EVALUATIONS

Justice research predicts three types of reactions resulting from justice evaluations:
emotional, cognitive, and behavioral. Equity theory proposes that the results of allocation
provoke emotional reactions among people such that they will be satisfied with equitable
rewards but will feel distress from inequitable rewards (Adams 1965). Further, theories
predict that the intensity of this distress is proportionate to the magnitude of the perceived
inequity of the situation, and that the thresholds are lower for under-reward than overreward (Austin and Walster 1974; Homans 1974). Researchers have therefore predicted
that in order to avoid unpleasant feelings employees will a) change their actual
contributions or rewards, b) psychologically distort either their own or others’
contributions or rewards, c) change their reference others, or d) leave the relationship
(Adams 1965; Walster et al. 1978). Empirical studies do offer supporting evidence for
hypotheses derived from Adams’ theory. (See Goodman and Friedman 1971 for a
comprehensive review of the evidence for Adams' theory).
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More recently, researchers have argued that reacting to unfair distributions is one
of the fundamental features of humans by showing that children effectively react to unfair
situations from as early as age three, and that by around age six they have moderate
levels of competence in requesting fairness (LoBue et al. 2011). One vein of research
found that individuals care about fair distributions and take actions to restore fairness to
situations even when it is costly for them to do so (e.g., Fehr and Gachter 2002), and that
their actions to restore fairness to the situation are mediated by emotions (Chebat and
Slusarczyk 2005).

2.4.1 Emotional reactions
Justice theory has paid attention to emotional reactions since the early stages of
justice research (Turner 2007). Many studies have tested the prediction that perceived
injustice produces emotional distress among individuals in that situation and confirmed
the effects: people are more content when they are fairly rewarded than when they are
under- or over-rewarded. Adams (1965) reported anger and guilt as the main emotional
reactions to under-reward and over-reward, respectively. Homans (1974) also maintained
that justice evaluations produce emotional responses. People are satisfied with fair
results. But when they are unjustly rewarded, people react unfavorably: under-rewards
produce anger, while over-rewards produce pleasure and guilt. Homans also predicted
that the magnitude of the emotional reactions would be proportionate to the intensity of
the evaluated injustice: the greater the evaluated injustice, the greater the emotional
distress.
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Considerable research has empirically established the relationship between justice
evaluations and emotional responses. Cropanzano and Folger (1989) manipulated the
autonomy of the decision and reference points of their rewards in their experiment, and
they found that unfair outcomes, when coupled with unfair processes, produced negative
emotions among participants. Similarly, Weiss and his associates (1999) found that
effects of positive emotions (e.g., happiness) were highly dependent on distributive
justice, while negative emotions (anger, guilt) were influenced by a combination of
distributive and procedural justice. Krehbiel and Cropanzano (2000) and Hedgtvedt and
Killian (1999) also observed that unfair outcomes produce negative emotions and that
procedural justice plays a little role.
While most studies have measured emotional distress using self-report
questionnaires after injustice occasions (e.g., Jasso and Rossi 1977), other research
adopts neuro-scientific approaches to directly measure participants’ reactions. Markovsky
measured physiological arousal right after participants received results using a galvanic
skin response measure and found that perceived unjust rewards produced higher skin
conductance than perceived just rewards (Markovsky 1988b). Tabibnia and her associates
(2008) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to test the impact of fairness
on positive emotions. Consistent with Markovsky’s research on the emotional impact of
fairness, this research confirmed that the reaction is instant, automatic and intuitive
without delay. Focusing on the positive emotional impact of fairness, their results reveal
that not only unfair situations produce negative emotions, but also fair situations produce
positive emotions; fairness of rewards leads to happier individuals.

28

Emotions arising from justice evaluations mediate behavioral responses.
VanYperen and his associates (2000) found that perceived injustice causes negative
emotions among individuals, which in turn causes destructive behavioral reactions such
as exit, neglect, and aggressive voice in the workplace. Murphy and Tyler also found that
negative emotions produced by violations of procedural justice played a mediating role in
resistance to authorities (Murphy 2009; Murphy and Tyler 2008).

2.4.2 Behavioral reactions
Observable behavioral reactions to perceived injustice have also drawn justice
researchers’ attention. Justice theory assumes that individuals who suffer from emotional
distress aroused by perceived injustice will tend to eliminate the distress by restoring the
fairness of allocation (Walster et al. 1978). To reduce their distress, that is, individuals
can attempt to change the allocation pattern, actually or perceptually: over-rewarded
people are expected to increase their contribution relative to under-rewarded people,
decrease their productivity within the group, or take more profit from the group. If these
methods are not available or they are too costly, the individuals are expected to leave the
relationship.
Though previous justice research has been interested in the roles of emotion in
justice process, emotion had not been a main topic in exchange process until 1990s. It is
mainly because exchange theory traditionally assumes that individuals are motivated by
instrumental reasoning and they make decisions based on rationality. Therefore,
exchange theory views emotion as a residual. However, researchers show that
individuals’ behaviors are guided not only by reason but also by emotions (e.g., Frank
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1988), and emotions are widely influenced by context, process and the outcomes of
exchange (Lawler and Thye 1999). Relational cohesion theory clarifies the role of
emotions in group cooperation (Lawler and Yoon 1993, 1996; Lawler et al. 2000).
According to this theory, frequent exchange promotes group cohesion, which is mediated
by positive emotion. That is, the positive emotions generated from exchange relations
lead individuals to a higher level of commitment to the group, which results in behaviors
such as gift giving, staying in the group and contributing more to the group. In this line of
reasoning, it is expected that individuals feel positive emotions based on having received
fair rewards from groups, so they are more likely to cooperate with those groups.
Social science provides abundant evidence of how unfairness harms
organizations. Studies have shown that unjust actions by their company lead employees
to be uncooperative or even destructive by leaving the organization, acting irresponsibly,
and aggressively expressing their voice to pursue their own interests (VanYperen et al.
2000). The same study showed that injustice induces those destructive impulses in
organizations through negative emotions such as distress, hostility, and irritability.
Empirical evidence also shows that under-paid workers are more likely to have poor
work attitudes (Folger and Konovsky 1989) and to engage in theft from their companies
to make up for the under-payment (Greenberg and Scott 1996). Chebat and Slusarczyk
(2005) investigated behavioral responses to unfair treatment in customer relations in the
service industry and found that perceived injustice leads to customers having lower levels
of loyalty to the company.
2.5. CONCLUSION
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Distributive justice theory offers a wide range of theoretical implications for this
dissertation. It explains the antecedents of justice evaluations and its consequences. In
particular, based on the equity rule, the early distributive theory explains how justice
evaluations are produced among individuals and explains the emotional and behavioral
responses to perceived injustice. This research also found that under-reward has a
stronger effect than an equivalent over-reward.
Distributive justice theory was developed by taking into account the subjectivity
of justice evaluations. It shows that justice evaluations are not based only on absolute
ratios of investments to outcomes. Rather, justice evaluations can be biased by
individuals’ subjective preferences (such as different justice rules) by which individuals
evaluate their rewards, or the referents they use for evaluating their reward levels. Among
the judgmental biases in justice evaluations, this study focuses on the asymmetry between
under-rewards and over-rewards.
Prospect theory and negativity bias explain the asymmetry in the effects of unjust
rewards with different valences. According to this theory, a negative event has a stronger
effect on human perception than a positive event of the same intensity. This theory
explains the findings from equity theory that under-rewards have stronger effects than
over-rewards in justice evaluations and on emotional distress.
Research on procedural justice also provides us with theoretical insights. The
research shows that individuals evaluate situations not only based on their outcomes but
also based on their own experiences of the procedures that regulate the outcome
allocation. Importantly for the present research, procedural justice also considers the
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justice process through time. Research also suggests that consistency over time and
across actors are important criteria.
Recent research on justice has been focusing more on the consequences of justice
evaluations. Justice evaluations produce emotional distress among individuals and lead to
behavioral responses. Researchers have also discovered that emotion plays a mediating
role between justice evaluations and behavioral consequences.
Based on the theoretical background reviewed above, I present a theory of reward
stability, justice evaluations and group cooperation in the next chapter. In doing so, I also
present the scope conditions to which the theory can be applied. Then I introduce the
body of the theory. Lastly, I present several hypotheses derived from the theory.
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CHAPTER 3
A THEORY OF REWARD STABILITY, JUSTICE EVALUATIONS
AND GROUP COOPERATION
This chapter presents a theory that draws upon and integrates the literature reviewed in
Chapter 2. Previous research illustrated the subjectivity of justice evaluations, and the
emotional and behavioral consequences of justice evaluations. This literature also
suggests the asymmetric effects of unjust rewards, that is, that under-rewards are more
keenly experienced than over-rewards. A theory of reward stability, justice evaluations
and group cooperation will explain the impact of reward stability on the justice process.
At the heart of the theory is a path that suggests that the instability of the reward system
itself decreases justice evaluations among individuals, leading to increased emotional
distress and subsequently lower levels of cooperation within the group.

3.1 SCOPE CONDITIONS

The phenomena predicted by the presented theory do not manifest in every context of
social relations. Rather, like other scientific theories, the theory presented in this study
can be applied to a limited set of scope conditions (Walker and Cohen 1985).
First, individuals are motivated to invest in exchange relations with the
expectations of better returns on their investments than if they were to pursue the outputs
individually (Axelrod 1984; Walster et al. 1978). Justice theory, especially distributive
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justice theory, is based largely on exchange theory, which regards maximizing selfinterest as a main motivation for cooperation (Homans 1961; Walster et al. 1978).
Though not every real-world relationship is founded on maximizing self-interest, in most
forms of human cooperation, the participants pursue profits. The current theory examines
human relations where individuals try to maximize the profits they receive from their
exchange relations.
Second, the theory presented here applies to exchange relations, in which
individuals are to be rewarded for their investments and contributions directly from the
recipients of their contributions, for example direct exchange or productive exchange
relations (Emerson 1972; Lawler et al. 2000; Molm 1994). In this type of exchange,
individuals can track their investments and rewards from the group more accurately. This
condition is quite different from that of indirect exchange relations, such as generalized
exchange. In a generalized exchange, individuals’ rewards do not return directly to the
contributor but return to other individuals in the group. In such a situation, the contributor
cannot keep precise track of the history of rewards. Thus, the effect of the history of
rewards will not be prominent.
Third, this theory applies to social exchange relations characterized by repeated
transactions over time among group members as opposed to one-time economic
transactions between strangers (Molm et al. 2001). Many social exchange relations occur
in groups that are stable over time and space and individuals interact with each other
multiple times in the groups. Under these circumstances, the justice evaluations of
exchange relations come not only from immediate rewards but also from past reward
experiences.
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3.2 REWARD STABILITY, JUSTICE EVALUATIONS AND GROUP
COOPERATION

At the heart of a theory of reward stability, justice evaluations and group cooperation is a
path that addresses the way that the stability of rewards produces a higher level of justice
evaluations and a lower level of emotional distress, and subsequently affects group
cooperation positively. Before I go further, however, the concept of stability of rewards
needs to be clarified. The stability of rewards is defined as the extent to which a series of
rewards stays invariable over time. In many cases, the instability of rewards is conflated
with the unfairness of an allocation of rewards because unstable rewards can produce an
unjust distribution of rewards. However, a series of unstable rewards does not result
necessarily in an injustice of outcomes if one incongruent reward can be compensated by
another incongruent reward. Conversely, a series of stable rewards could produce an
unjust allocation of rewards if those rewards are invariably higher or lower than the just
level of rewards over time. Though instability of rewards and injustice of allocations are
closely related empirically, this theory demarcates the instability of rewards from unjust
rewards and tries to investigate the net effect of reward stability.
Considerable previous research has studied the conditions that maintain higher
levels of justice evaluations in groups (see Hegtvedt 2006 for a review). According to the
research, both fair procedures and the fair distribution of rewards in the allocation of
rewards affect justice evaluations among group members. However, past research on
justice evaluations did not consider time in explaining the process of justice evaluations
(Lilly et al. 2010). Rather, the research was interested mostly in the result of a single
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reward (e.g., Austin and Walster 1974). As a result, the researchers ignored the role of the
history of rewards in the justice process and assumed that only the final state of rewards
matters in producing justice evaluations.
One reason that justice evaluations through time should be addressed is that in
everyday life, exchange relations among individuals are not one-time transactions. On the
contrary, individuals usually belong to groups and repeat exchange relationships with
others in the same groups. From relationships with intimate partners or close friends to
economic transactions, individuals frequently sustain repetitive relationships. Sometimes,
certain exchange relationships last for large periods of a person’s lifetime. In those
situations, individuals’ justice evaluations about their groups are not independent but are
highly contingent upon each other.
Though the time dimension in human relations has been neglected widely, a few
researchers showed the history of exchanges and the shadow of the future play critical
roles in shaping individuals’ responses to their groups or to other group members.
Literature on trust shows that people build trust relations through a series of risk-taking
behaviors over time (e.g., Cook et al. 2005). Therefore, without experiences of repeated
exchange relations, individuals cannot establish trust relations with others. Axelrod
(1984) showed that the “shadow of the future” promotes cooperation in the prisoner’s
dilemma (PD). Individuals who rationally pursue self-interest cannot cooperate with each
other in the PD game because mutual defection is a dominant strategy of the game
(Komorita and Parks 1996). This causes a social dilemma, where collective interests are
at odds with individual interests. According to Axelrod, however, if they think the
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exchange relationship will last with the same partner, they perceive the characteristics of
the game as the assurance game instead of the PD game and then they can cooperate.
Another reason that time should be considered in the justice process is that when
they make justice evaluations, individuals focus on both the overall result of reward
allocations and on changes in the rewards. Prospect theory challenges the common
assumption that only the final state matters when people make a decision. The theory
asserts that individuals focus more on changes or differences than on the state of the
situation itself (Kahneman 1994; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Novemsky and
Kahneman 2005). Moreover, the theory shows that individuals take into account the gains
and losses relative to their reference point to evaluate a situation and that losses loom
larger than gains of the same size. This suggests that the aggregation of all the justice
evaluations of individual rewards will not be the same as the justice evaluation of the
aggregation of a series of rewards at the final stage, when rewards are repeated over time.
It is also predicted that the variability of the rewards itself affects justice evaluations
among the members, irrespective of the eventual objective reward levels. Extending the
idea of asymmetry into justice evaluations through time allows us to theorize about the
relationship between over-reward and under-reward at different times and about how
much reward is needed to compensate for an unjust reward to keep the individuals’
justice evaluations at a desirable level.
The present theory begins with the assumption that instability of rewards over
time produces the feeling of being under-rewarded among individuals. In turn, the feeling
of being under-rewarded lowers justice evaluations. This is consistent with the findings
of justice theory and prospect theory. As stated above, both justice theory and prospect
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theory show that unjust rewards have a negative effect on justice evaluations among
group members regardless of the direction of the injustice. To remedy the damaged
justice evaluations, an opposite direction of unjust reward (compensation) is necessary.
However, because of the asymmetry in the effects of under-reward and over-reward on
justice evaluations, an over-reward of the same amount as a previous under-reward
cannot fully cancel out the negative effect of the under-reward. On the other hand, an
under-reward at one time can more than fully offset the effect of the same size of overreward at another time. In fact, it will have a net negative effect on justice evaluations.
Therefore, if the intensity of incongruence is the same in both cases, justice evaluations
made in light of either an under-reward followed by an over-reward, or of an over-reward
followed by an under-reward, should be lower than those made in response to two just
rewards.
Let’s assume that two unjust rewards are equally incongruent with the socially
expected reward level, but in opposite directions. The first one is an under-reward, A-, at
one time, t1, and the other is an over-reward, A+, at another time, t2. The individual is
expecting a just level of reward, A0 in both cases. In terms of actual reward levels, an
under-reward at one time, A-t1, can be canceled out by the same size of an over-reward at
another time, A+t2. In this situation, the overall actual reward will be the same as the just
reward at t2, A0t2, in objective terms: A-t1 + A+t2 = A0t2. Thus, the instability of rewards
has no effect on the reward system in absolute terms. In other words, he/she is justly
rewarded overall.
However, when it comes to justice evaluations, they are not experienced the same
way as an objective reward level is perceived. Because of the asymmetric effects of
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rewards of opposite directions, the level of evaluated injustice of an under-reward, E-t1,
will be greater than that from an over-reward at a later time, E+t2. In other words, the
effect of under-rewards is stronger than that of over-rewards of the same size: |E-t1| >
|E+t2|. Therefore, the overall justice evaluation of the situation is lower than the justice
evaluation from a just reward situation: E-t1 + E+t2 < E0t2. As a result, the justice
evaluation will be lower than it would be if there were no asymmetries between unjust
rewards at all. The situation is the same if over-reward comes first E+t1 and the underreward E-t2 is presented later. The under-reward deletes the incongruence from the former
over-reward. But the evaluated overall justice level from those rewards is lower than the
justice evaluation level from a just reward: E+t1 + E-t2 < E0t2.
In turn, the present theory asserts that justice evaluations from unstable rewards
lead to emotional reactions in predictable ways. Early justice studies have shown that
evaluated injustice will cause emotional reactions and that the intensity of those reactions
is positively related to the level of evaluated injustice (Adams 1965; Anderson 1965;
Walster et al. 1973). The present theory assumes that unstable reward structures cause
perceptions of injustice despite the fact that just rewards “average out” over time. If this
is true, then individuals in unstable reward systems should feel distress even though they
are rewarded at a just level overall, and the level of distress is proportionate to the
evaluated injustice.
The present theory is complete with consideration of the effect of instability on
cooperation levels, which is mediated through justice evaluations. Based on rational
choice theory, research on exchange relations has long neglected the role of emotion in
social actions (Lawler and Thye 1999). However, researchers have investigated the effect
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of emotion on individuals’ behaviors. Relational cohesion theory (Lawler and Yoon
1993, 1996) and the affect theory of social exchange (Lawler 2001) explain how
emotional arousal affects members’ group-oriented behaviors. These theories assert that
positive emotion toward the group, produced by structural power and exchange
frequency, leads individuals to enhance their commitment to the group via a higher level
of cohesion. A relational model of procedural justice also reveals that a feeling of being
valued by group leads individuals to compliance with the authority of the group (Tyler
1990, 2010; Tyler and Lind 2001).

3.3 ASSUMPTIONS

Moving forward, I derive a series of logically interrelated assumptions from the
conceptual system introduced in section 3.2. The core of the theory is a causal model that
suggests the effect of stability of rewards on justice evaluations and accompanying
emotional distress and subsequent group cooperation (see Figure 3.1).

Instability of
Rewards

+

Negativity
Bias

-

Justice
Evaluations

+

Emotional
Distress

-

Group
Cooperation

Figure 3.1 Theoretical Model of Reward Stability and Group Cooperation
The first assumption addresses the relation between the stability of rewards and
the degree of negativity bias. Prospect theory suggests the asymmetric effects of unjust
rewards in opposite directions (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Research on negativity
bias also postulated that the negativity of negative entities grows faster than the positivity
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of positive entities (Rozin and Royzman 2001). Based on those arguments, this theory
assumes that individuals produce feelings of being under-rewarded when they experience
unstable rewards and the intensity of the feelings are proportionate to the intensity of the
instability of rewards. Based on the previous studies, Assumption 1 of the present theory
states that,
Assumption 1: The more unstable the reward system, the more strongly it
produces negativity biases in perception of rewards.
The main argument of justice theory is that feelings of being under-rewarded will
lead individuals to negative justice evaluations and that the size of (in)justice evaluations
will be proportionate to the amount of negativity bias. Thus, the second assumption of the
present research asserts that,
Assumption 2: The stronger the negativity biases on perception of rewards, the
stronger the injustice evaluations among the actors.
The third assumptions of the theory states the positive relationship between
justice evaluations produced by unstable rewards and emotional distress:
Assumption 3: The stronger the injustice evaluation, the stronger the emotional
distress.
The last assumption of the present theory asserts the behavioral consequences
resulting from the emotional distress among individuals. The theory focuses especially on
the level of cooperation as a behavioral reaction:
Assumption 4: The stronger the emotional distress, the less the members of a
group will cooperate.
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Together, these assumptions constitute a theory explaining how reward stability is
related to cooperation in groups. The logical relationship between the assumptions allows
for the derivation of several hypotheses that will be tested in subsequent chapters.
Specifically, three empirical studies were designed to test the theory presented in this
dissertation. The first empirical study analyzed secondary survey data to test how the
stability of the rules that determine rewards in workplaces influences employees’
willingness to cooperate with the company (beyond their motivation toward selfinterests). In the second empirical study, I performed a controlled laboratory experiment
to test the theory more rigorously. This experiment tested the hypotheses that trace the
path from reward stability and group cooperation via justice evaluations and concomitant
emotional distress. In the last empirical study, I examined how presentation orders of
reward stability affect justice evaluations.
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CHAPTER4
ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY SURVEY DATA
In the previous chapters, I reviewed the theoretical background and presented the basic
assumptions of the theory presented in this dissertation. This theory suggests a
relationship between the stability of rewards and group cooperation through justice
evaluations and concomitant emotional distress. Based on justice theory and prospect
theory, I assume that unstable rewards decrease the level of justice evaluations, positive
emotions within a group, and willingness of group members to cooperate. In the next
three chapters, I introduce empirical studies that test the effectiveness of the presented
theory.
Using a nationally representative sample survey from South Korea, the first
empirical study aims to show how the stability of rules in organizations affects
employees’ justice evaluations and commitment to their companies. Employees are
usually in long-term exchange relationships within their organizations and are mostly
motivated by self-interest (Wayne et al. 1997). Therefore, a workplace setting is well
suited to the scope conditions of the theory presented in Chapter 3.
In this chapter, I investigate the effects of stability of rules on justice evaluations
and attitudes towards the organization. The theory developed in this dissertation predicts
the effect of the stability of rewards on subsequent reactions. However, in many cases,
the instability of rewards comes from the instability of rules that decides the distribution
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of resources in groups. Although the empirical study in this chapter does not test directly
the arguments of the theory presented in this dissertation, it serves as a preliminary
empirical test of the phenomena predicted by the theory with a large probability sample.

4.1 HYPOTHESES

Based on the assumptions stated in the previous chapter, this study developed a set of
hypotheses. First, I assume that unstable rules in workplaces cause instability of rewards
in those workplaces. Of course, not all unstable rewards result from unstable rules. For
instance, instability of rewards can be caused by individual characteristics or by the noise
of the rewards system (Kollock 1993). But if rules are unstable in a group, they inevitably
produce unstable rewards in the group. Derived from the first and the second assumptions
of the theory introduced in the previous chapter, the first hypothesis states that,
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The more stable the employees perceive their workplace rules
to be, the more likely the employees will be to think that their payments
from the companies are just.
The theory tested in this research predicts behavioral reactions from the stability
of rewards. To test this process, the first study measures the effect of the stability of rules
on staying behavior and intention to work hard, both of which are indicative of
cooperation. Though it does not test every causal step of the theory, this study
investigates the main path of the theory, which asserts a relationship between justice
evaluations and group cooperation. The second hypothesis states pertains to the
relationship between the stability of rules and willingness to stay.
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Hypothesis 2 (H2): The more stable the employees perceive their workplace rules
to be, the more likely the employees will be to stay at their current
workplaces, even if better payments are available from other companies.
The third hypothesis states the relationship between the stability of rules of the
company and employees’ intentions to work hard for their company.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The more stable the employees perceive their workplace rules
to be, the more likely the employees will be to work harder than they have
to.

4.2 DATA

The study analyzes nationally representative survey data from the 2009 Korean General
Social Survey (KGSS). The KGSS is an annual nationwide survey conducted by the
Survey Research Center (SRC) at Sungkyunkwan University since 2003. Adopting the
latest GSS of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) as a model, each wave of
the KGSS consists of replicated core questions, the International Social Survey Program
(ISSP) annual topic module, and special modules. In 2009, the special module was
“Inequality and Fairness,” which encompasses various questions on peoples’ justice
perceptions and wageworkers’ attitudes toward their workplaces, both relevant items for
testing the hypotheses in this study.
To meet the rigorous requirements of the ISSP, the KGSS used full probability
sampling procedures across the country. The population was defined as household
residents aged 18 or over who live in South Korea. From this population, the three-stage

45

area probability sampling method selected 250 sample blocks, and 10 individuals are
sampled from each block. The 2009 KGSS consists of 1,599 respondents with an overall
response rate of 64%.4 This study analyzes data from 657 wage-earning respondents
working for someone else.

4.3 MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSES

Dependent variables – The main interest of this study is the effect of rule consistency on
workers’ justice evaluations and their group commitment levels. To test H1, the
dependent variable is the employees’ justice evaluations regarding their payments from
their workplaces. The survey question asked how just they perceived the payments from
their companies to be. Their answers were measured in five-point Likert scales (see
Appendix A for the details of the questionnaire).
The other hypotheses predict that stability of rules affects individuals’ cooperation
levels within their groups. To measure the cooperation level within their groups, I use
two questions. One question measured employees’ intentions of staying with the
company by asking how willing they would be to turn down another job opportunity that
offered them a little bit more pay than their current company. The other question
measured their willingness to work harder than they have to in order to help their
company. Both of these variables were measured on five-point Likert scales.

4

Further information on KGSS and the data set is available at the Korea Social Science
Data Archive (KOSSDA, www.kossda.or.kr) or at the Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research (ICPSR 34665, www.icpsr.umich.edu).
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Independent variables – The independent variables, predicted to affect justice
evaluations and cooperation levels within the company, were measured in two different
questions. The first question asked how free from arbitrariness employees thought their
company’s rules were. The other question asked how stable respondents perceived the
rules in their companies to be over time. Both sets of answers were measured on a fivepoint Likert scale.
Control variables – The KGSS data contain comprehensive demographic
variables used for controlling variables. Each statistical analysis controls for respondents’
gender, age, education level, wage from the job, subjective social class, and marital
status.
Gender is coded as 0 for “male” and 1 for “female.” Marital status was originally
asked in six categories: married, widowed, divorced, separated, never married, and
cohabitating. For the purpose of this study, marital status was recoded as a dichotomous
variable using 0 for “currently not married” and 1 for “currently married.” In both the
original survey and this study, educational achievement was measured in eight categories
ranging from 0- no formal school to 7- Graduate school (Ph. D). Respondent income was
defined as the monthly wage from respondents’ workplaces and measured in South Korea
won (KRW). Subjective social class was measured in a 10-point Likert scale that ranges
from 1- bottom to 10- top. Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables
included in the study.
Analysis – All the dependent variables (justice evaluations, willingness to work
hard, willingness to stay) are measured in five-point Likert scales. Those categorical
variables cannot meet the basic assumption of OLS regression, which requires
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables
Variable

N

Min

Max

Female1

657

.429

–

0

1

Age

655

39.736

11.227

18

84

Education

657

4.061

1.353

0

7

Married2

657

.661

–

0

1

Income

653

5.342

3.142

0

21

Social Class

657

4.700

1.524

1

9

No Arbitrariness

615

2.418

.996

1

5

Consistency

615

2.863

1.047

1

5

Justice Evaluation

654

2.416

.723

1

5

Work Hard

623

3.856

.819

1

5

Stay

624

2.946

1.247

1

5

1
2

Mean

Std. Dev.

Male is the reference category.
Currently unmarried is the reference category.

dependent variables to be measured in continuous form. The typical measure to handle
categorical variables in regression analysis is to use logistic regression. Among the
various logistic regression models, “ordered logit” analysis is the most useful when the
categories of each variable can be ranked in order and the distances between the various
categories are not the same (Long 1997) (see Appendix B for the tests of the proportional
odds assumption).

4.4 RESULTS

The first analysis tests Hypothesis 1 (H1) which describes the relationship between the
stability of rules and justice evaluations of employees’ payments (see Table 4.2). After
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Table 4.2 Summary of Ordered Logistic Regression Estimating Justice Evaluations
Model 1
Odds
Std. Err.
Ratios

Model 2
Odds
Std. Err.
Ratios

Model 3
Odds
Std. Err.
Ratios

1.163

(.200)

1.146

(.198)

1.144

(.197)

Age

.993

(.009)

.990

(.009)

.992

(.009)

Education

.913

(.069)

.918

(.069)

.926

(.070)

Female1

Income

1.002

(.001)**

1.002

(.001)***

1.002

(.001)**

Class

1.324

(.084)***

1.311

(.084)***

1.309

(.083)***

Married2

.793

(.151)

No Arbitrariness

.836

(.162)

1.234

(.102)*

Consistency

(.156)
(.098)**

1.272

N

609

Log Likelihood

– 627.083

– 623.807

– 622.131

.037

.042

.045

48.000

54.560

57.910

Pseudo R2
LR Chi2
*

.810

*

***

p ≤ .05, p ≤ .01, p ≤ .001
Male is the reference category.
2
Currently Unmarried is the reference category.
1

list-wise deletion for all three models, 609 cases are used in this analysis. Overall, the
results from the test support H1. Model 1 is the baseline model and includes only control
variables. Comparisons with the baseline model show the net effect of the independent
variables. Models 2 and 3 include the main effects: no arbitrariness and consistency,
respectively. Statistics for model fit show that Models 2 (Likelihood-Ratio Chi2(1) = 6.56,
p =.010) and 3 (Likelihood-Ratio Chi2(1) = 9.91, p =.002) are significantly better than
Model 1 (the baseline model), which includes only control variables. In Model 1,
respondents’ incomes and subjective social class are positively related to respondents’
justice evaluation levels.
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Model 2 tests the effect of arbitrariness in rules regarding their companies’ pay on
employees’ justice evaluations. The result shows a positive effect of the independent
variable; each unit increase in perceptions of non-arbitrary application of company rules
results in a 23.4% increase in the odds of reporting a fairer income. Model 3 shows that
consistency of rules in employees’ workplaces is also positively related to their justice
evaluations of their payments from the companies. Each unit increase in perceptions of
the consistency of workplace rules results in a 27.2% increase in the odds of reporting a
fairer income.
The second analysis tests H2 that describes the effect of stability of reward on
staying behavior when better alternatives are available (see Table 4.3). Model 1 (baseline
model) presents the effects of control variables and shows that age, income, and class are
positively related to employees’ staying behaviors.
Model 2 tests the effect of arbitrariness on staying behavior. The statistics for
model fitness show that the models with the main effect variables are significantly
improved over Model 1, which only includes the control variables (Likelihood-Ratio
Chi2(1) = 5.61, p = .018). Model 2 shows that while age, income, and subjective social
class still have significant effects on staying behavior; each unit increase in perceptions
of non-arbitrary application rules of their workplaces associates with a 20.1% increase in
the odds of staying with their current workplaces, even when better alternatives are
available from other companies than their counterparts. Model 3 also supports H2 in that
each unit increase in perceptions the consistency of workplace rules results in a 23.7%
increase in the odds of staying with the current workplace. A likelihood ratio test reveals
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Table 4.3 Summary of Ordered Logistic Regression Estimating Willingness to Stay
Model 1
Odds
Ratios

Std. Err

Model 2
Odds
Ratios

Std. Err

Model 3
Odds
Ratios

Std. Err

Female1

1.228

(.198)

1.210

(.196)

1.211

(.196)

Age

1.033

(.009)***

1.031

(.009)***

1.033

(.009)***

Education

.961

(.067)

.967

(.068)

.984

Income

1.001

(.001)*

1.001

(.001)*

1.001

(.001)**

Class

1.150

(.067)*

1.139

(.066)*

1.131

(.066)†

Married2

1.216

(.216)

1.283

(.230)

1.246

(.222)

1.201

(.093)*
1.273

(.092)***

No Arbitrariness
Consistency
N
Log Likelihood
Pseudo R2
LR Chi2

(.069)

611
– 928.518

– 925.713

– 922.995

.029

.032

.035

55.750

61.360

66.800

†

p ≤ .1, * p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001
Male is the reference category.
2
Currently Unmarried is the reference category.
1

that Model 3 is significantly different compared with the baseline model (Chi2(1) = 11.05,
p < .001).
The third analysis tests H3 which describes the relationship between the stability
of rewards and employees’ willingness to work harder than they are required to help their
organizations’ success (see Table 4.4). Model 1 (the baseline model) shows that age and
income are positively related to willingness to work hard. In terms of model fit, a
likelihood-ratio test reveals that the Model 2 (Likelihood-Ratio Chi2(1) = 4.16, p = .041)
significantly improves over the Model 1. Model 3 is marginally improved over the Model
1 (Likelihood-Ratio Chi2(1) = 3.54, p = .059).
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Table 4.4 Summary of Ordered Logistic Regression Estimating Willingness to Work
Hard
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3

Female1
Age
Education
Income
Class
Married2

Odds
Ratios

Std. Err

Odds
Ratios

Std. Err

Odds
Ratios

Std. Err

.912

(.154)

.904

(.153)

.899

(.152)

1.019

(.009)*

1.016

(.009)†

1.018

(.009)*

.918

(.066)

.921

(.067)

.924

(.067)

1.001

(.001)*

1.001

(.001)*

1.001

(.001)*

.976

(.060)

.969

(.060)

.971

(.060)

1.102

(.208)

1.152

(.219)

1.115

(.211)

1.178

(.095)*
1.152

(.086)†

No Arbitrariness
Consistency
N

610

Log Likelihood
Pseudo R2
LR Chi2

– 714.304

– 712.222

– 721.535

.015

.018

.018

22.290

26.450

25.830

†

p ≤ .1, *p ≤ .05, **p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001
Male is the reference category
2
Currently Unmarried is the reference category
1

The second model strongly supports H3. Each unit increase in perceptions of nonarbitrary application of company rule associates with a 17.8% increase in the odds of
working harder than they have to work. Though the significance is not as strong (p =
.060) as Model 2, Model 3 shows the marginal effectiveness of the independent variable;
each unit increase in perception of the consistency of workplace rules results in a 15.2%
increase of the odds of working harder than they are required from their company.
Overall, the third analysis also supports H3.
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4.5 DISCUSSION

This study tests a theory about the relationship between reward stability and group
cooperation using data from a national sample survey. The survey asked wageworkers in
South Korea about their perceptions of the stability of rules that decide the reward
distribution in their companies. The respondents also answered questions regarding their
justice evaluations and their willingness to stay in their current companies and work hard
for them. Three sets of logistic regression analyses support the hypotheses. Net of other
variables, employees who believe that their workplace rules are not arbitrary and are
applied consistently over time evaluate their payments from the company to be more just
than employees who believe otherwise. Moreover, the former is more willing to stay at
their current jobs, even though higher monetary incentives are available from other
organizations, and they are willing to work harder than they are required to work.
These results are consistent with the theory in this dissertation and support the
hypotheses stated in section 4.1. Assuming that the stability of rewards in a group
originates with the stability of rules that regulate the pattern of resource distribution in the
group, this study shows that arbitrary and inconsistent application of rules lowers justice
evaluations of rewards and cooperation levels within the group. The results of this study
show that the stability of rules will affect people’s justice evaluations and behavioral
reactions, as predicted in previous research (Leventhal 1980).
This study has its limitations. First, despite the strengths of the representative
sample survey, the analyses of survey data are not enough to test a theory rigorously,
especially when the theory has not been tested previously. Though cross-sectional sample
data provide external validity to the results, from this methodology, it is difficult to infer
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a causal relationship among theoretical components, particularly when psychological
measurements are included in the analysis (Singleton and Straits 2005). Second, this
study tests the effect of the stability of rule as a proxy measurement for the stability of
rewards. In the real world, the stability of allocation rules and the stability of rewards
rules are closely related empirically. Logically, however, those two concepts are clearly
distinguished. Therefore, it does not directly test the effect of the stability of rewards on
justice evaluations and its consequences, which the theory of this dissertation states.
Considering the limitations, the next chapter introduces a controlled laboratory
experiment that tests the causal relationship suggested in the theory more rigorously. In
the controlled laboratory experiment, objective reward level will be manipulated to
directly test the effect of reward stability on group cooperation.
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CHAPTER 5
AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE EFFECT OF REWARD STABILITY
The results from the study detailed in Chapter 4 demonstrated that employees’ justice
evaluations of the payments from their companies and their commitment to their
companies are positively related to the stability of rules which allocate rewards in the
organizations. However, more scrupulous testing is needed to investigate the causal
relationship among the variables. Thus, the second study of this dissertation uses a
controlled laboratory experiment to test the foregoing theoretical discussion. By
controlling other factors in the real world, the experimental method is the best way to
confirm the effects of the manipulated factors predicted in a theory, deprived of possible
alternative explanations (Thye 2007). The aim of the experiment is not to replicate any
naturally occurring situation in the real world, but to test a theory-driven argument on the
relationship between reward stability and group cooperation. Provided the theory is
supported, it may then be applied to explain real world phenomenon (Zelditch 1969).5
The main purpose of this experiment is to test the basic theoretical argument
discussed in the previous chapters. Combining justice theory and negativity bias, I predict
that the stability of rewards is positively related to a higher level of justice evaluations
among group members. This experiment tests the prediction empirically. The effect of
unjust rewards on justice evaluations over time has yet to be tested empirically, whereas
5

There has been criticism on the external validity of experiments in social sciences, and
Thye (2007) among others provided a justification for experimental methods.
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many researchers have tested the emotional and/or behavioral consequence of justice
evaluations. Therefore, it is necessary to test whether and how instability in rewards
affects justice evaluations. This experiment tests novel implications of justice theory and
prospect theory.
The second purpose of the experiment is to test the entire sequential process from
reward stability to group cooperation, by way of justice evaluations and emotional
reactions. The theory asserted in this dissertation predicts the emotional and behavioral
consequences of the perceived justice evaluations. Therefore, this experiment measures
emotional reactions, behavioral decisions, and justice evaluations to test the whole
process of the theory.

5.1 HYPOTHESES

To test the theory, the current experiment tests a set of hypotheses derived directly from
the assumptions stated in Chapter 3. First, the presented theory assumes that the
instability of rewards causes negative bias in the justice evaluation process and
consequently decreases justice evaluations among group members. Combing
Assumptions 1 and 2, this study hypothesizes the following:
Hypothesis 1: The stability of the reward structure is positively related to justice
evaluations.
Assumption 3 asserts a negative relationship between justice evaluations and
emotional distress. Conversely, it suggests a positive relationship between the instability
of rewards and emotional distress. The second hypothesis of this study is as follows:
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Hypothesis 2: The instability of the reward structure is positively related to
emotional distress.
Assumption 4 explains low levels of group cooperation as a result of emotional
distress. If Hypotheses 1 and 2 are correct, we can also hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3: The stability of the reward structure is positively related to group
members’ cooperation.

5.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

The experiment took place in the University of South Carolina’s Laboratory for
Sociological Research. The experiment was a completely randomized single factor
design, manipulating the stability of rewards. The stability of rewards was manipulated at
three levels: a stable-reward condition (control condition with very little variability), a
low-instability condition, and a high-instability condition.
Subjects – Undergraduate students at the University of South Carolina were asked
to participate for pay in this study. A project assistant contacted volunteers through a
web-based subject pool management system to schedule a session in the laboratory. The
experiment had 30 subjects in each of three conditions for a total of 90 subjects in the
experiment.
General Procedures – Subjects were placed in isolated rooms with the personal
computers on which they completed the experiment. The experimental protocol was
completely computer mediated, which minimizes interaction between the participants and
the experimenter while recording the participant’s attitudes and behaviors. This
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procedure was designed to reduce the possibility of demanding characteristics (Orne
1962) and other sources of bias.
Upon arrival, research assistants guided the subjects to separate computerequipped rooms. The subjects were informed that the study addresses reward satisfaction
in a group task and asked to complete a consent form. After completing the consent form,
the subjects read a description about a group cooperation situation. They were asked to
take part in artificially controlled group tasks that guaranteed more profits through
collaboration than through individual achievement.
Specifically, the instructions explained that the subjects were in a four-person task
group that consisted of one manager (M) and three programmers (P1, P2, and P3). They
were told that the role of each subject was randomly assigned, and that only one subject
was assigned to the manager’s position while the other three people were assigned to the
programmers’ roles. However, all the subjects were assigned to one of the programmers’
roles (P2), and the manager and other programmers were simulated by the computer
program.
The cover story stated that there was demand for new computer programs in the
marketplace. Each computer programmer was able to develop his or her own program to
meet the demands. However, if the programs were developed and marketed in-house,
both the programmer and the company could save on indirect costs, such as
advertisement. Thus, the company was asking freelance programmers to develop the
software cooperatively. The company promised to distribute the profits according to the
contributions of each programmer. The company expected that the invested resources
would bring 1.5 times higher revenue from the market.
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According to the company’s guidelines, the manager is supposed to return 1.3
times the investment made by the programmer and keep 0.2 times the investment for
profit. The programmers were told that despite the guidelines, their rewards would be
decided by their manager at the end of every contribution opportunity. That is, although
the manager was supposed to distribute rewards based on the company’s guidelines, the
final decisions were up to the manager. The subjects could not participate in the reward
allocation process, but they could express their reactions to their reward levels by
answering the questionnaires presented after each investment opportunity (Refer to
Appendix C for the instructions and survey questions for the experiment). The
participants could decide the amount of resources they invested in subsequent investment
opportunities.
At the end of the instructions, several quizzes were administered to make sure that
the subjects understood the structure of the experiment. Then the subjects participated in
the investment opportunities (exchange sessions). The subjects engaged in 14 rounds of
investment-reward trials. Each experiment took about 30–50 minutes for subjects to
complete. After the subjects finished the experiment, they were debriefed and paid in
cash.
Reward Stability Manipulation – Prior to starting the group task, subjects were
informed in detail about the processes that determined reward levels, and they were
primed to expect 1.3 times higher rewards than their investments in each round from the
company. Depending on the condition, subjects engaged in a number of investmentreward events. Upon completion of each round of investments, each subject received a
share of the group product as a reward.
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In the stable-reward condition, rewards from the company varied between 1% and
3%. In the low-instability condition, reward levels deviated from the promised reward
level within 30% (20% on average), either positively or negatively, according to
predetermined parameters. This enabled the researcher to test the net effect of instability
of the reward system.
In the high-instability condition, all situations were the same as in the lowinstability situation except for the rate of incongruence between subjects’ expected
rewards and their actual rewards. In this condition, rewards deviated more than 30%, but
the deviation did not exceed 50% (40% on average) from the expected reward level. It is
important to note that in both the slightly and severely unstable situations, at the end of
the group task, the overall reward level was the same as the expected level. Except for the
fair reward trials (trial 7, 14), the levels of incongruence in each trial were randomized.
However, the pattern of the fluctuation of rewards is identical across the conditions (see
Figure 5.1), and so any biases resulting from this pattern are constant between conditions.
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Debriefing – After the experiment, the subjects were debriefed to ensure that they
understood fully all instructions and had no suspicions of the manipulation or the
deception. The subjects were also informed of the overall purpose of this research, the
hypotheses being tested, and so on. Before leaving, they were paid $10 in cash, regardless
of their performance in the experiment.

5.3 MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSES

Measurement – Three sets of dependent variables were measured in this experiment:
justice evaluations, emotional reactions, and behavioral responses. To measure justice
evaluations, the questionnaire asked about subjects’ evaluations of the reward from their
group after each exchange session. They evaluated their overall reward level using a 10point Likert scale, with anchors of just/unjust (Molm et al. 2003). Emotional distress
measures how strongly subjects feel various positive or negative emotions about their
payment (e.g., anger, disappointment, and resentment). These items were also measured
with 10-point Likert scales (α=.77 in a previous study; Hegtvedt and Killian 1999). Along
with negative emotions, the subjects’ level of satisfaction was also measured.
Cooperation levels are a critical part of the endogenous process predicted in the
theory. This was measured in two ways. First, to assess cooperation levels directly,
subjects’ investments of their resources in the group were measured. Second, subjects
were asked how much they would like to stay in their exchange network if offered to
move to another exchange network that ensures higher profit. Staying behavior is a
previously used indicator of commitment to the group (Lawler et al. 2008).

61

Analyses – The experiment consisted of 14 trials and measured the changes in
individuals’ reactions based on fluctuation of rewards over trials. Since an array of trials
is nested in each subject, I use a multi-level model for the analyses. Using an individual
growth model (Singer 1998), the analyses decompose fixed and random effects using a
maximum-likelihood estimator. To specify the statistical model, which estimates the
effect of reward stability on justice evaluations, emotional reactions, and group
cooperation, I compare multiple empirical models using tests of nested models and
goodness-of-fit indices, such as the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Appendix D).
Then I estimate a statistical model with which to make inferences based on the preferred
model specification.

5.4 RESULTS

The analyses reports data from 90 participants. A total of 109 participants were recruited
in the experiment and 19 were excluded from the analyses for reporting being suspicious
or not understanding the manipulations. The participants were randomly distributed
across the three conditions. Each condition has 30 participants, and each participant
completed 14 rounds in the experiment, making a total sample of 1,260 participantrounds.
Univariate Statistics – Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the
control variables. Subjects’ gender, age, race, and school year in college were measured
as control variables. Race was originally coded in five categories: white, African
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Participants’ Demographics
Variable

# of
Participants

# of
Observations

Mean

Std. dev.

Min

Max

Female

90

1260

.500

–

0

1

Age

90

1260

19.856

1.603

17

28

White

90

1260

.778

–

0

1

College Year

90

1260

2.356

1.149

1

5

American, Hispanic, Asian, and other. Since the majority of participants were white
(77.8%), race was recoded into a dichotomous variable using “white” and “non-white.”
Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 present the descriptive statistics of the justice evaluations, the
four emotional responses, and the two behavioral reactions, respectively. All the
indicators were measured in 10-points Likert scales. These tables also offer the basic
statistics of the measurements across the conditions. The tables show that the level of
justice evaluations is highest in the control condition, followed by the low-instability
condition, and then by the high-instability condition. Emotional responses show the same
patterns: negative emotion is the highest in the high-instability condition, followed by the
low-instability condition and then by the control condition. When it comes to positive
emotion, the level of satisfaction is highest in the control condition and lowest in the
high-instability condition. Behavioral reactions show a pattern similar to the previous
measurements: the level of cooperation measured in investments to the group and
willingness to stay in the current group is higher in the control condition than in the
experiment conditions.
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Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Justice Evaluations
Variable

# of
Participants

# of
Observations

Mean

Std. dev.

Min

Max

Justice Evaluation

90

1260

6.350

3.025

1

10

High-Instability

30

420

5.912

3.347

1

10

Low-Instability

30

420

6.176

3.180

1

10

Control

30

420

6.962

2.364

1

10

Mean

Std. dev.

Min

Max

Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Emotional Responses

Variable
Anger

# of
Participants

# of
Observations

90

1260

3.749

2.986

1

10

High-Instability

30

420

4.412

3.310

1

10

Low-Instability

30

420

3.688

3.034

1

10

Control

30

420

3.148

2.414

1

10

90

420

4.075

3.138

1

10

High-Instability

30

420

4.617

3.412

1

10

Low-Instability

30

420

4.202

3.226

1

10

Control

30

420

3.405

2.602

1

10

Resentment

90

420

3.662

2.908

1

10

High-Instability

30

420

4.136

3.181

1

10

Low-Instability

30

420

3.602

2.935

1

10

Control

30

420

3.248

2.505

1

10

Satisfaction

90

1260

6.202

3.159

1

10

No-Instability

30

420

6.824

2.648

1

10

Low-Instability

30

420

6.133

3.256

1

10

High-Instability

30

420

5.648

3.417

1

10

Disappointment
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Table 5.4 Descriptive Statistics of Behavioral Reactions
Variable
Investment

# of
Participants

# of
Observations

Mean

Std. dev.

Min

Max

90

1260

364.615

121.238

0

500

High-Instability

30

420

336.243

132.579

0

500

Low-Instability

30

420

354.645

116.853

0

500

Control

30

420

402.957

102.734
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500

90

420

6.141

3.199

1

10

No-Instability

30

420

6.536

3.020

1

10

Low-Instability

30

420

6.517

3.306

1

10

High-Instability

30

420

5.371

3.132

1

10

Staying Behavior

Justice Evaluations – The main argument of this dissertation is that the instability
of rewards decreases justice evaluations among group members. Figure 5.2 presents a
trend of the means of justice evaluations over trials with confidence intervals in each
condition. As seen, levels of justice evaluations exactly follow the fluctuations of reward
manipulations described in Figure 5.1.
A global F-test reveals a significant effect of the reward stability on the level of
justice evaluations (F(2, 87) = 3.78, p = .027) (Table 5.5). The result also shows that the
variation of the actual reward level (a level of manipulations) has a significant effect on
justice evaluations (F(2, 87) = 52.43. p < .001).
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Figure 5.2 Justice Evaluation over Trials in Each Condition

Table 5.5 Test of Fixed Effects on Justice Evaluation
F-value

p-value

3.78

.027

Reward Level (F1, 87)

52.43

< .001

Condition x Reward Level (F2, 87)

13.35

< .001

Condition (F2, 87)

–2LL

4823.00

BIC

5295.50

Chi2 (104)

939.53
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< .001

Table 5.6 Comparisons of the Level of Justice Evaluation1, 2
Effect
Condition3
Reward Level

Condition

Estimate

Std. Err.

t-value

p-value

High-Instability

–.8171

.2976

–2.75

.002

Low-Instability

–.4458

.2976

–1.50

.069

.4305

.0753

5.72

< .001

1

1 – “not just at all,” 10 – “very just”
This model controls for the interaction between reward level and condition.
3
Control condition is the reference category
2

The parameter estimates for the fixed effects (Table 5.6) show that the justice
evaluations in the experimental conditions are lower than the justice evaluations in the
control condition (low-instability condition, t(86) = –1.50, one-tailed, p = .069; highinstability condition, t (86)= –2.75, one-tailed, p = .002). The results also show that the
actual reward level is positively related to justice evaluations: the higher the actual
rewards compared with expected rewards, the higher the perceived justice evaluations (t
(86) =

5.72, one-tailed, p < .001). The results support Hypothesis 1 which predicts a

positive relationship between the stability of rewards and justice evaluations.
To determine the effect of reward level on justice evaluations, I compared the
justice evaluations in each of the unjust reward trials with the justice evaluations in the
just reward trials (Table 5.7). The result shows that the reward level is positively related
to justice evaluations among the under-reward trials (under-rewarded by 1~50%).
However, in the over-reward trials (over-rewarded by 1~50%), the effect of the reward
manipulations is not significantly related to justice evaluations. That is, the effect of an
under-reward is considerably stronger than the effect of an over-reward of the same size.
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Table 5.7 Comparison of Justice Evaluations across Manipulation Levels
Reward Level (%)

Under-rewards

∆ in Est. Means

Std. Err.

t-Value

p-Value

–50

–5.718

.358

–15.98

< .001

–40

–5.329

.328

–16.23

< .001

–30

–4.634

.279

–16.64

< .001

–20

–4.742

.292

–16.26

< .001

–10

–3.324

.277

–12.02

< .001

–3

–2.655

.395

–6.72

< .001

–2

–2.484

.373

–6.66

< .001

–1

–1.697

.335

–5.07

< .001

1

.356

.325

1.09

.277

2

–.334

.368

–.91

.367

3

–.134

.384

–.35

.728

10

.112

.281

.40

.690

20

.324

.303

1.07

.288

30

.472

.269

1.76

.082

40

.045

.334

.13

.893

50

.016

.354

.05

.963

Control

Over-rewards

This confirms the asymmetry between under-rewards and over-rewards. This
result also shows that even a very small amount of instability (1~3%) affects justice
evaluations.
Emotional Reactions – The second hypothesis predicts a positive relationship
between the instability of rewards and negative emotions. To test the hypothesis,
emotional reactions are measured along four dimensions: anger, disappointment,
resentment, and satisfaction.
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Anger: Anger is the one of the main emotions that accompanies unjust rewards
(Dalbert 2002). An omnibus model test from a multi-level model shows that the fixed
effect of condition (F(2, 87) = 7.17, p = .001) and reward level (F(1, 87) = 72.83, p < .001)
are significantly related to anger (Table 5.8). The parameter estimates for the fixed
effects (Table 5.9) show that there are significant differences between the control
condition and the high-instability condition. Anger is higher in the high-instability
condition than in the control condition (t(86) = 3.26, one-tailed, p = .002). Actual reward
level shows a negative effect on anger (t(86) = –7.08, one-tailed, p < .001). The results are
consistent with Hypothesis 2.

Table 5.8 Test of Fixed Effects on Anger
F-value

p-value

7.17

.001

Reward Level (F1, 87)

72.83

< .001

Condition × Reward Level (F2, 87)

20.07

< .001

Condition (F2, 87)

–2LL

4583.80

BIC

5056.20

Chi2 (104)

998.01

< .001

Table 5.9 Comparisons of the Level of Anger1, 2
Effect
Condition3
Reward Level

Condition

Estimate

Std. Err.

t-Value

p-Value

High-Instability

.9031

.2766

3.26

< .001

Low-Instability

–.0292

.2661

–0.11

.456

–.3464

.0489

–7.08

< .001

1

1 – “not angry at all,” 10 – “very angry”
This model controls for the interaction between reward level and condition.
3
Control condition is the reference category.
2
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Disappointment: An omnibus F-test from a multi-level model reveals a significant
effect of condition (F(2, 87) = 11.63, p <.001) and reward level (F(1, 87) = 95.13, p < .001)
on the level of disappointment (Table 5.10) on disappointment. The parameter estimates
for the fixed effects (Table 5.11) show significant differences between the control
condition and the experimental conditions. Among the three conditions, disappointment
is highest in the high-instability condition (t(86) = 4.76, one-tailed, p < .001), followed by
the low-instability condition (t(86) = 1.56, one-tailed, p = .062). Actual reward level also
shows a negative effect on disappointment (t(86) = –7.67, one-tailed, p < .001).

Table 5.10 Test of Fixed Effects on Disappointment
F-value

p-value

Condition (F2, 87)

11.63

.001

Reward Level (F1, 87)

95.13

< .001

Condition × Reward Level (F2, 87)

23.75

< .001

–2LL

4677.00

BIC

5149.50

Chi2 (104)

887.89

< .001

Table 5.11 Comparisons of the Level of Disappointment1, 2
Effect
Condition3
Reward Level

Condition

Estimate

Std. Err.

High-Instability

1.2847

.2701

4.76

< .001

Low-Instability

.3990

.2565

1.56

.062

–.3937

.0513

–7.67

< .001

1

t-Value

1 – “not disappointed,” 10 – “very disappointed”
This model controls for the interaction between reward level and condition.
3
Control condition is the reference category
2
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p-Value

Resentment: The last negative emotion measured in this experiment is resentment.
An omnibus F-test from a multi-level model reveals a significant difference in resentment
between conditions (F(2, 87) = 4.20, p =.002) and reward levels (F(1, 87) = 27.95, p <.001)
(Table 5.12). The parameter estimates for the fixed effects (Table 5.13) show that there
are significant differences between the control condition and the high-instability
condition (t(86) = 2.60, one-tailed, p = .005). Actual reward level shows a negative effect
on disappointment (t(86) = –4.33, one-tailed, p < .001).

Table 5.12 Test of Fixed Effects on Resentment

Condition (F2, 87)
Reward Level (F1, 87)
Condition × Reward Level (F2, 87)

F-value

p-value

4.20

.002

27.95

< .001

7.33

.001

–2LL

4728.50

BIC

5201.00

Chi2 (104)

967.91

< .001

Table 5.13 Comparisons of the Level of Resentment1, 2
Effect
Condition3
Reward Level

Condition

Estimate

Std. Err.

t-Value

p-Value

High-Instability

.8735

.3363

2.60

.005

Low-Instability

.0391

.3232

.12

.452

–.2826

.0653

–4.33

< .001

1

1 – “not resentful,” 10 – “very resentful”
This model controls for the interaction between reward level and condition.
3
Control condition is the reference category
2
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Satisfaction: Satisfaction is the only positive emotion measured in the experiment.
An omnibus F-test from a multi-level model shows that there are statistically significant
differences among the conditions (F(2, 87) = 9.51, p < .001) and the effect of actual reward
manipulation (F(1, 87) = 145.39, p < .001) (Table 5.14). The parameter estimates for the
fixed effects (Table 5.15) show that there are significant differences between the control
condition and the experimental conditions. Satisfaction in the high-instability condition
(t(86) = –4.25, one-tailed, p < .001) and the low-instability condition (t(86) = –2.97, onetailed, p = .002) are significantly lower than the satisfaction level in the control condition.
Actual reward level shows a positive effect; that is, the higher the actual reward the

Table 5.14 Test of Fixed Effects on Satisfaction

Condition (F2, 87)
Reward Level (F1, 87)
Condition × Reward Level (F2, 87)

F-value

p-value

9.51

< .001

145.39

< .001

39.66

< .001

–2LL

4745.70

BIC

5218.20

Chi2 (104)

754.90

< .001

Table 5.15 Comparisons of the Level of Satisfaction1, 2
Effect
Condition3
Reward Level

Condition

Estimate

Std. Err.

High-Instability
Low-Instability

–1.0602
– .7367
.4859

.2495
.2482
.0518

1

t-Value
–4.25
–2.97
9.38

1 – “not satisfied,” 10 – “very satisfied”
This model controls for the interaction between reward level and condition.
3
Control condition is the reference category
2
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p-Value
< .001
.002
< .001

higher the satisfaction level (t(86) = 9.38, one-tailed, p < .001).
The results from the analyses of the effect of the instability of rewards on four
emotional reactions reveal that individuals are more likely to feel negative emotions, such
as anger, disappointment, and resentment when their rewards are unstable. At the same
time, the instability of rewards also decreases positive emotions. Moreover the intensity
of emotional reactions is proportionate to actual reward levels. Overall, the results
confirm that the instability of rewards produces emotional distress and decreases positive
emotions among the individuals in a group. Hypothesis 2 is supported.
Behavioral Reactions – Hypothesis 3 predicts that unstable rewards decreases
group cooperation. In this experiment, group cooperation is measured in two ways: the
level of investments to the group, and the willingness to stay in the current relationship
despite better alternatives.
Investment: Investments were measured by participants’ decisions of how much
they wanted to invest in their company on each experimental round.6 An omnibus F-test
from a multi-level model shows that investments are influenced by both condition (F(2, 80)
= 6.14, p = .003) and trial (F(13, 80) = 6.75, p < .001) (Table 5.16). A multi-level model
which estimates the effects of condition, trials and their interaction, along with the
controls, offers a comparison of investments between conditions. The results show that
investments are significantly higher in the control condition than the low-instability
condition (t(80) = –2.83, one-tailed, p = .006) and high-instability condition (t(80) = –3.20,
one-tailed, p = .002) (Table 5.17)

6

Comparisons between mixed models shows that “trial” explains investments better than
“reward level.” Thus, I included “trial” instead of “reward-level” to specify a multi-level
model (see Appendix D for the specification of this model).
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Table 5.16 Test of Fixed Effects on Investment
F-value

p-value

6.26

.015

.16

.689

White (F1, 80)

5.14

.026

Year (F1, 80)

2.98

.024

Condition (F2, 80)

6.14

.003

Trial (F13, 80)

6.75

< .001

Condition × Trial (F26, 80)

1.93

.014

Female (F1, 80)
Age (F1, 80)

–2LL

14444.80

BIC

14917.30

Chi2 (104)

598.98

< .001

Table 5.17 Comparisons of the Level of Investment1
Effect
Condition2
1
2

Condition

Estimate

Std. Err.

t-Value

p-Value

High-Instability

–61.0881

19.2900

–3.20

.002

Low-Instability

–55.0551

19.4496

–2.83

.006

Ranged from 0 to 500
Control condition is the reference category
Staying: The willingness to stay in the current exchange relationship despite

better alternatives is another indicator of the level of group cooperation. It was measured
in a 10-point Likert scale which ranges from 1- “definitely move to other company” to 10
– “definitely stay in the current company.” An omnibus F-test from multi-level model
shows that condition (F(2, 83) = 5.67, p = .005) and actual reward level (F(1, 83) = 18.72, p <
.001) significantly affect the level of willingness to stay (Table 5.18). Among control
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Table 5.18 Test of Fixed Effects on Staying Behavior
F-value

p-value

Female (F1, 83)

.21

.647

Age (F1, 83)

.40

.528

White (F1, 83)

7.10

.009

Year (F1, 83)

.02

.896

5.67

.005

18.72

< .001

5.89

.004

Condition (F2, 83)
Reward Level (F1, 83)
Condition × Reward Level (F2, 83)
–2LL

4912.20

BIC

5384.60

Chi2 (104)

1324.50

< .001

Table 5.19 Comparisons of Staying Behaviors1, 2
Effect
Condition3

Condition

Estimate

Std. Err.

High-Instability

–1.3757

.5070

–2.71

.004

Low-Instability

–1.5355

.4995

–3.07

.002

.2328

.0624

3.73

< .001

Reward Level

t-Value

p-Value

1

1 – “definitely move,” 10 – “definitely not move”
This model controls for the interaction between reward level and condition.
3
Control condition is the reference category
2

variables, race influences staying behavior: white people are more likely to stay in current
exchange relations than are non-whites.
The parameter estimates for the fixed effects (Table 5.18) show that there are
significant differences between the control condition and the experimental conditions in
willingness to stay in the current group. The level of willingness to stay in the highinstability condition (t(86) = –2.71, one-tailed, p = .004) and the low-instability condition
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(t(86) = –3.07, one-tailed, p = .002) is significantly lower than the control conditions.
There is also a positive effect of actual reward on an individual’s willingness to stay (t(86)
= 3.73, one-tailed, p < .001).
This experiment shows that the stability of rewards from groups is positively
related to group cooperation among individuals. Based on these results, I conclude that
Hypothesis 3 is supported by this experiment. The effect of instability on group
cooperation is highly significant both in terms of investment levels and in terms of
willingness to stay in the current group despite the presence of better alternatives.

5.5 DISCUSSION

In this chapter I described a controlled laboratory experiment which tested the predicted
relationships among variables as described in Chapter 3. The theory predicts that the
instability of rewards decreases justice evaluations, increases emotional distress, and
decreases the willingness of group members to cooperate. The results from a controlled
laboratory experiment with three conditions clearly and consistently support the
hypotheses derived from the theory. As expected, the stability of rewards is positively
related to justice evaluations and to positive emotional reactions, which are measured
along four different dimensions (anger, disappointment, resentment, and satisfaction)
among the group members. Furthermore, the stability of rewards leads individuals to
higher cooperation levels: the more stable the rewards from the group, the more likely the
individuals are to invest their resources and to stay in the current group, even though
better profits are available from other groups.
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The theory assumes that the negative effect of reward instability on justice
evaluations comes from an asymmetry between unjust rewards in opposite directions
(e.g., Austin and Walster 1974). The results from the experiment reveal that justice
evaluations in all under-reward trials are significantly lower than the justice evaluations
in the just-reward trials, while justice evaluations in all the over-reward conditions are not
significantly different from justice evaluations in just-reward trials. In other words,
although under-rewards reduce justice evaluations among people, the same extent of
over-rewards cannot cancel out the effect of under-rewards. This confirms the assumption
of asymmetry between under-rewards and over-rewards.
It is also noteworthy to see the strength of the effect of unstable rewards on the
justice evaluations of the control condition. Theoretically, the control condition was
supposed to have no fluctuations of rewards over time. However, to create a more
realistic experiment, I implemented a very small amount of instability in the control
condition (1~3%) compared with the low-instability (10~30%) and high-instability
(30~50%) conditions. I expected that the effect of instability between 1% and 3% would
have almost no effect on justice evaluations. However, the results show that even such a
small amount of instability lowers justice evaluations. This demonstrates how powerful
the effect of unstable rewards on justice evaluations can be.
In sum, the experiment presented in this chapter tests the main arguments of the
theory introduced in this dissertation. The results consistently and clearly support the
hypotheses directly derived from the theory. The results also reveal the asymmetry
between under-rewards and over-rewards in justice processes and show the influence of
the instability of rewards. The next chapter introduces another controlled laboratory
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experiment that aims to replicate the results of this chapter and to test for possible order
effects (e.g., recency) of the instability.
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CHAPTER 6
EVALUATING THE EFFECT OF THE EXPERIENCE OF THE INSTABILITY OF
REWARDS
The results in Chapter 5 demonstrate the influence of the stability of rewards on group
cooperation via the asymmetrical effects of unjust rewards on justice evaluations. The
results also revealed that the instability of rewards increases emotional distress among
individuals. As an extension to that experiment, in this chapter, I discuss a test for the
moderating effects of the “presentation order” of unstable rewards on justice evaluations.
There are two objectives of this study. First, it aims to replicate the results of the
first experiment. The main purpose of this dissertation is to introduce a theory explaining
the effect of reward stability on justice evaluations which has never been tested
empirically before. Unlike the previous experiment, the control condition of this
experiment does not implement any fluctuations in the level of rewards. Therefore, the
control condition of this experiment shows the baseline of the justice evaluations and
contrasts the effect of the instability of rewards more clearly. The second objective of this
experiment is to show the effect of the presentation order of unstable rewards. To do this,
I conducted another controlled laboratory experiment with five conditions that presents
the instability of rewards in different orders. Previous research showed that the order in
which people experience events shapes their judgments (e.g. Murdock 1962). There have
been two lines of research on the effect of the presentation order. Research on the
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primacy effect maintains that information presented first has a stronger effect on
judgments and is more likely to change individuals’ judgments than information that is
presented last (Forgas 2011; Lund 1925). On the other hand, other researchers have found
a recency effect, which suggests that information presented last has a stronger effect than
the information that is presented first (Furnham 1986; Panagopoulos 2011). Though both
the primacy effect and the recency effect show the power of serial positioning effects, the
evidence is contradictory.
Prospect theory explains the role of an initial reference point and an anchor in
individual’s judgments. The endowment effect explains that individuals value the goods
that they already possess more and evaluate the goods of others to be less valuable
(Thaler 1980). For example, Kahneman and his colleagues (1990) showed that people
who already possessed a mug were willing to sell it for around $7, while people who did
not possess a mug were willing to pay only around $3 to buy the same one. Tversky and
Kahneman (1974, 1981) also found an anchoring effect on judgments, which explains
that variation of the reference point of judgments can change the evaluations of gains and
losses. The theory suggests that a starting point and a variation of the reference point over
time play an important role in producing evaluations among individuals.
Markovsky (1988a) demonstrated that justice evaluations are shaped by social
contexts or framing information. Based on the results from five vignette experiments, he
showed that justice evaluations could be biased either toward (assimilation effect) or
away from (contrast effect) the anchor when the anchor is salient in the situation.
Furthermore, the study shows that the information presented first can serve as an anchor
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for the information that follows. Markovsky’s research suggests that the order of
evaluations.
Based on previous research, here I assume that the order of the stability (or
instability) of rewards also has a net effect on justice evaluations. If justice evaluations
are affected more strongly by the reward events that come first (primacy effect), the
instability of rewards at an early time point will have a stronger effect on justice
evaluations than unstable rewards of the same degree which come later. By contrast, if
reward events experienced more recently affect justice evaluations more strongly
(recency effect), the instability of rewards that come later will have a stronger effect on
the justice processes than unstable rewards of the same degree presented at an early stage.
If the presentation order of rewards affects justice evaluations, the presentation
order between under-rewards and over-rewards will cause bias in evaluating justice of
rewards. The experiment in Chapter 5 shows that an under-reward has a stronger effect
that an over-reward of the same size. Based on the result, it is predicted that if the
primacy effect is prominent, the justice evaluations will be lower when under-rewards
appear prior to over-rewards than when over-rewards appear first and are followed by the
same size of under-rewards. By contrast, if the recency effect is stronger than the primacy
effect in an unstable rewards situation, the justice evaluations will be lower if overrewards appear prior to under-rewards. In this experiment I predict a primacy effect will
be salient for justice evaluations and that the rewards presented earlier will have a
stronger effect than the reward presented later. Therefore, the justice evaluations will be
lower in the primacy conditions (conditions 1 and 2) compared to the recency conditions
(conditions 3 and 4). Also, the justice evaluations in under reward first conditions
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(conditions 1 and 3) will be lower compared to the over-reward first conditions
(conditions 2 and 4).

6.1 HYPOTHESES
The main purpose of this experiment is to test the effect of presentation order under the
unstable reward situation. This study tests hypotheses expecting primacy effects which
explains that the information or events come earlier are more influential than those
presented later on individuals’ judgments. Therefore, the hypotheses state that:
Hypothesis 1 (Primacy effect) (H1): The negative effect of unstable rewards on
justice evaluation is stronger when they appear earlier.
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): The effect of the instability of rewards on justice evaluation
is stronger when unstable rewards appear earlier than stable rewards.
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): The effect of the instability of rewards on justice evaluation
is stronger when under-rewards appear earlier than over-rewards.
The other purpose of this study is to confirm the results from the previous chapter. Since
the effect of the instability of rewards has never been tested empirically, it is necessary to
test the effect in multiple experiments to confirm the effectiveness of the theory.
Therefore, this experiment tests the same hypothesis as in the previous chapter: that
stability of rewards is positively related to justice evaluations.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The stability of the reward structure is positively related to
justice evaluations.
In addition to testing the hypothesis from the previous experiment in Chapter 5,
In addition, this study aims to replicate the results from the previous studies.
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6.2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

Most of the procedures, including the cover story, of this experiment were the same as
the procedures in the previous experiment, except for the stability manipulation schedule,
the number of conditions, and the number of rounds. This experiment manipulated the
instability of rewards in two ways (2 × 2): the order of unstable reward (primacy vs.
recency) and the order of incongruence (under-reward first vs. over-reward first). To
establish a baseline of justice evaluations, I added a control condition which does not
include any incongruence of rewards throughout the experiment. There is, therefore, a
total of five conditions. Each condition consisted of 18 rounds. There were four more
rounds per condition than in the previous experiment, and the rounds were divided evenly
into three sub-phases as explained in the next section.
Stability Manipulation – The experiment was a 2 × 2 design that crossed the
presentation order of unstable rewards and the presentation order of unjust rewards. In the
primacy conditions (conditions 1 and 2), twelve unstable rewards were presented first and
followed by six stable rewards (Figure 6.1). Whereas, in the recency conditions
(conditions 3 and 4), stable rewards appeared in the first six rounds and unstable rewards
were presented in the next twelve rounds (Figure 6.2). In the unstable reward rounds, the
rewards from the group deviated from the expected reward level by between 10-30%.
Each of the primacy conditions and recency conditions consisted of two subconditions: an under-reward-first condition and an over-reward-first condition. In the
under-reward-first condition, rewards from the first six rounds among the twelve unstable
reward rounds were lower than the expected level, and the rewards fluctuated above the
expected level in the following six rounds. On the other hand, in the over-reward-first
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condition, the rewards fluctuated above the expected level in the first six rounds among
the twelve unstable reward rounds, and followed by six rounds in which the rewards
fluctuated below the expected level. In addition to four experimental conditions, there
was a control condition in which the rewards from the group were stable throughout the
experiment.
In respect of the hypothesis, H1a predicts that the justice evaluations in the
primacy conditions will be lower than the justice evaluations in the recency conditions
(conditions 1 and 2 < conditions 3 and 4). In addition, H1b predicts that the justice
evaluations in the under-reward-first conditions will be lower than the justice evaluations
in the over-reward-first conditions (conditions 1 and 3 < conditions 2 and 4). When it
comes to the presentation order effect, H3 predicts that justice evaluations in the control
condition (condition 5) will be higher than the justice evaluations in the other four
experimental conditions (conditions 1–4).
Measurement – To test the hypotheses, which are stated above, this experiment
measured justice evaluations with a 10-point Likert scale after each investment
opportunity. In addition, subjects’ gender, age, race, and school year in college were
measured as control variables.
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Figure 6.1 Manipulation Schedule of the Primacy Condition
Conditions
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Figure 6.2 Manipulation Schedule of the Primacy Condition
Conditions
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6.3 RESULTS

The analyses reports data from 150 participants. A total of 164 participants were recruited
in the experiment and 14 were excluded from the analyses for reporting being suspicious
or not understanding the manipulations. The participants were randomly distributed
across the five conditions. Each condition has 30 participants, and each participant
completed 18 rounds in the experiment, making a total sample of 2,700 participantrounds. Table 6.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the control variables. As in the
previous experiment, subjects’ gender, age, race, and year in college were measured.

Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Participants’ Demographics
Variable

# of
Participants

# of
Observations

Female

150

2700

.500

Age

150

2700

20.407

White

150

2700

College Year

150

2700

Mean

Std. dev.

Min

Max

–

0

1

2.167

17

34

.640

–

0

1

2.533

1.094

1

5

Table 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics of justice evaluations. Consistent with
H2, justice evaluations are higher in the control condition than the experimental
conditions. In regards to the experimental conditions, the recency conditions show a
higher justice evaluation compared to the primacy conditions. Figure 6.3 plots a trend of
the means of justice evaluations over trials with confidence intervals in each condition.
The graph shows that the justice evaluations reflect the reward manipulations over trials.
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Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics of Justice Evaluation
# of
# of Obs.
Participants

Condition
Total

Mean

Std. dev. Min

Max

150

2700

7.642

2.902

1

10

60

1080

7.146

2.990

1

10

Primacy condition 1

30

540

7.467

2.996

1

10

condition 2

30

540

6.824

2.951

1

10

Subtotal

60

1080

7.475

3.048

1

10

Recency condition 3

30

540

7.215

2.961

1

10

condition 4

30

540

7.735

3.112

1

10

condition 5

30

540

8.969

1.839

1

10

Subtotal

Control

Figure 6.3 Justice Evaluations over Trials in Each Condition
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In particular, the justice evaluations in under-rewards trials exactly follow the
manipulation schedule. However, it shows that the differences of justice evaluations
between just-rewards and over-reward trials are not as large as the differences of justice
evaluations between just-rewards and under-rewards trials.
Table 6.3 and Figure 6.4 show the asymmetric tendency more clearly. According
to the results from the comparison of the justice evaluations across different reward
levels, under-rewards have a negative effect on justice evaluations (–5.338 ~ –3.367)
while over-rewards have a positive effect on justice evaluations (+.275 ~ +.608).
However, the differences of the justice evaluations from the just-reward trials are larger
in the under-rewards trials compared with the over-rewards conditions. Figure 6.4 shows
the asymmetries in justice evaluations across the different reward levels.

Table 6.3 Comparison of Justice Evaluations across Manipulation Levels
Reward Level (%)

Under-rewards

Just-rewards

Over-rewards
1

Est. Means

Std. Err.

∆ of Means1

t-Value

p-Value

–30

3.329

.140

–5.388

–32.51

< .001

–20

4.656

.139

–4.060

–24.86

< .001

–10

5.349

.141

–3.367

–21.35

< .001

0

8.716

.114

10

8.991

.141

.275

1.74

.042

20

9.271

.139

.555

3.40

.001

30

9.324

.140

.608

3.67

< .001

Just-rewards is the reference category.
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Justice Evaluations (Mean with C.I.)
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Figure 6.4 Justice Evaluations across the Level of Rewards
To test the hypotheses, a multi-level model with trials nested in participants was
used (see Appendix D for the model specifications). First, I tested H1 which argued for
primacy effects of the unstable rewards on justice evaluations. To test the hypothesis, I
specified the effect of the presentation order of unstable rewards (primacy vs recency),
the presentation order of unjust rewards (under-rewards-first vs. over-reward-first), and
the interaction effect of the two manipulations. An omnibus test from the multi-level
model reveals a significant effect of the presentation order of unstable rewards (F(1, 145) =
22.96, p < .001) and the presentation order of unjust rewards (F(1, 145) = 8.27, p = .005) on
justice evaluations. The results also reveal a significant interaction between
manipulations (F(1, 116) = 5.94, p = .016) (Table 6.4).
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Table 6.4 Test of Fixed Effects on Justice Evaluation
F-value

p-value

22.96

< .001

Over-Rewards-First effect (F1, 116)2

8.27

.005

Recency × Over-Rewards First (F1, 116)

5.94

.016

Recency effect (F1, 116)1

–2LL

8391.0

BIC

9209.6

Chi2 (170)

2498.4

1
2

< .001

Primacy condition is the reference condition
Under-reward-first condition is the reference condition
Comparisons among conditions show that the estimated justice evaluations are

higher in the recency conditions (conditions 3 and 4) (M = 7.555) than the primacy
conditions (condition 1 and 2) (M = 6.671) and the difference is statistically significant
(t(116)= –4.79, two-tailed, p < .001) (Table 6.5). That is, unstable rewards have a stronger
negative effect on justice evaluations when they appear earlier in a series of rewards than
when they appear later. Therefore, the results support H1a.

Table 6.5 Justice Evaluation of the Primacy Conditions and the Recency Conditions

1

Condition

Est. Means

Std. Err.

Primacy conditions

6.671

.130

Recency conditions

7.555

.130

The primacy conditions are the reference category.
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∆ of Means1

t-value

p-value

.884

4.79

< .001

Table 6.6 Justice Evaluation of the Under-reward-first conditions and Over-reward-first
conditions
Condition

Est. Means

Std. Err.

∆ of Means1

Under-reward-first
6.848
.130
conditions
.530
Over-reward first
7.379
.130
conditions
1
The under-reward-first conditions are the reference category.

t-value

p-value

2.88

.005

To test H1b, I compared the justice evaluations in under-reward-first conditions
(conditions 1 and 3) to over-reward-first conditions (conditions 2 and 4). The result
shows that the over-reward-first conditions have higher justice evaluations (M = 7.379)
than the under-reward-first conditions (M = 6.848) and the difference is also statistically
significant (t(116)= –2.88, two-tailed, p = .005) (Table 6.6). The result supports the H1b. In
sum, the results from the analyses support H1. This results suggest that unstable rewards
have a stronger negative effect when they are presented in an earlier stage of a reward
sequence. It also indicates that unstable rewards have a stronger effect when underrewards come first than when over-rewards come first.
The results of the omnibus test presented in Table 6.4 show that the interaction
between the presentation order of unstable rewards and the presentation order of unjust
rewards is significant. Table 6.7 presents the main and interaction effects of the
manipulations on justice evaluations. The coefficients confirm that the recency
manipulation and over-reward-first manipulation have positive effects on justice
evaluations, as stated above. It also reveals that the recency manipulation (β = 1.333) has
a stronger effect than the over-reward-first manipulation (β = .980). When it comes to the
interaction effect, the result shows a positive interaction effect between the manipulations
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Table 6.7 Estimated Fixed Effects of the Manipulations and the Interaction
β

Std. Err.

t- value

p-value

Interception

8.045

.184

43.63

< .001

Recency effect1

1.333

.261

5.11

< .001

Over-Rewards-First effect2

.980

.261

3.76

.003

Recency × Over-Rewards First

.898

.369

2.44

.016

1
2

The primacy conditions are the reference category.
The under-reward first conditions are the reference category.

(β = .898). This suggests that the effect of over-reward-first manipulation is stronger in
the recency effect conditions than in the primacy effect conditions.
Table 6.8 presents the justice evaluations for each experimental condition.
Consistent with Table 6.7, justice evaluations are highest in condition 4 (M = 8.045) and
second highest in condition 3 (M = 7.066). Between the primacy conditions, condition 2
(M = 6.712) shows higher justice evaluations than condition 1 (M = 6.631).

Table 6.8 Estimated Means of Justice Evaluations across the Conditions
Condition
Primacy

Recency

Est. Means

Std. Err.

condition 1

6.631

.184

condition 2

6.712

.184

condition 3

7.066

.184

condition 4

8.045

.184

Lastly, I tested H2, which hypothesized the negative effect of the instability of
rewards on justice evaluations to replicate the result of the previous experiment. To do
this the justice evaluations between the experimental conditions and the control
conditions are compared. An omnibus test from the multi-level model reveals a
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Table 6.9 Test of Fixed Effects on Justice Evaluation
F-value

p-value

77.58

< .001

850.15

< .001

Condition (F1, 148)
Reward Level (F1, 148)
–2LL

9986.40

BIC

10843.20

Chi2 (104)

2026.77

< .001

significant effect of condition (F(1, 148) = 77.58, p < .001) and reward level (F(1, 148) =
850.15, p < .001) on justice evaluations (Table 6.7) (see Appendix D for the model
specifications).
A comparison between the control condition and the experimental conditions
reveals that the control condition shows higher justice evaluations than the experimental
conditions and the difference is statistically significant (t(116)= –8.81, two-tailed, p < .001
) (Table 6.8). This shows that the stability of rewards has a positive effect on justice
evaluations and supports H2.

Table 6.10 Justice Evaluation of the Experimental conditions and Control condition
Condition

Est. Means

Std. Err.

Experimental conditions

7.145

.100

Control condition
1

9.113

∆ of Means1

t-value

p-value

–1.967

–8.81

< .001

.200

The experimental conditions are the reference category.
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6.4 DISCUSSION

In this chapter, I introduced another experiment that tests the hypothesis supported in the
previous experiment. The hypothesis predicted a positive relationship between the
stability of rewards and justice evaluations. The results from this experiment supported
the hypothesis again. Consistent with the results from the previous experiment in Chapter
5, the current experiment showed that stable rewards are associated with a higher justice
evaluations. Though the current experimental study did not report the emotional and
behavioral responses resulting from the instability of rewards, the same consequences
were expected based on the results from the previous experiment.
The results of the current experiment also confirmed the asymmetric effects
between under-rewards and over-rewards. The theory presented in this dissertation
assumes that the negative effect of the instability of rewards on justice evaluations comes
from the asymmetry of unjust rewards (under-reward is worse than over-reward).
Different from the previous experiment, the control condition of this experiment had no
instability at all. This design allowed us to check the baseline of the justice evaluations
and to test the net effect of the instability of reward on justice. The results showed that
the effect of under-rewards is stronger than the effect of the same size of over-rewards.
The results also showed the effect of over-rewards on justice evaluations. Earlier
research on justice theory has argued that not only under-rewards but also over-rewards
reduce justice evaluations (e.g., Austin and Walster 1974; Homans 1961). However, other
empirical studies found a logarithmic function between reward levels and justice
evaluations (Jasso 1980; Markovsky 1985). In those studies, over-rewards increase, not
decrease justice evaluations, though the steepness decreases as the extent of over-rewards
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gets larger. The results from this experiment confirm the findings from the studies that
showed over-reward is positively related to justice evaluations, though the effect is not as
strong as under-reward.
Another objective of the experiment presented in this chapter is to examine the
effect of the presentation order of unstable rewards on justice evaluations. Between the
competing predictions associated with primacy effects and recency effects, this
experiment supported the primacy effect of the instability of rewards. The results showed
that the negative effect of unstable rewards is more salient when the unstable rewards are
presented earlier than stable rewards than vice versa. Furthermore, the results confirmed
the effect of the presentation order of unjust rewards on justice evaluations: unstable
rewards have a stronger effect when under-rewards are presented prior to over-rewards
than vice versa.
In brief, the second experiment of this dissertation confirmed the results from
experiment 1 and consistently supported the theory presented in Chapter 3. It also showed
the asymmetrical effects between under-reward and over-reward in terms of the
directions, as well as the intensity. The experiment also revealed that the effect of the
instability of rewards on justice evaluations varies according to the presentation order of
the instability of rewards. Between the two serial positioning effects: primacy effects and
recency effects, the results supported the primacy effects hypothesis by showing that the
effect of the instability of rewards is stronger when it appears earlier than when it appears
later.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
This dissertation introduces a new theory of reward stability, justice evaluations and
group cooperation, and also provides empirical evidence for the theory. In establishing
the theory, I combined justice theory, prospect theory, and the notion of negativity bias
from cognitive psychology. Integrating theoretical backgrounds from previous research,
this dissertation investigates the judgmental, emotional, and behavioral consequences of
unstable rewards in repeated exchange relations. In doing this, I introduced a set of novel
theoretical assumptions that postulate the effect of the stability of rewards on justice
evaluations and cooperation. The results from three empirical studies demonstrated the
effectiveness of this theory, both in the lab and in the “real world.”
Justice has been described as “the first virtue of social institutions” (Rawls 1971:
p. 2), and scholars have addressed justice problems for a long time (Solomon and Murphy
2000). Over the last five decades since the seminal studies of modern justice theory
(Adams 1963; Homans 1961), researchers from various disciplines have investigated the
factors and consequences of justice evaluations (see Jost and Kay 2010 for a review).
Distributive justice theory underpins this dissertation with a wide range of implications. It
maintains that incongruence between the expected level of rewards and the actual
rewards causes emotional distress, in turn individuals try to remove the negative feeling
by changing their inputs to and/or outcomes from the group in actual or perceived ways.
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The theory also argues that, if changing the input and/or outcome is not possible or is too
costly, individuals may also leave the relationship (Adams 1965).
This dissertation focuses on a limitation of previous justice research. Specifically,
most research on justice theory has assumed that the allocation of rewards at one time is
independent from the allocation of rewards at other times (e.g., Adams 1963; Austin and
Walster 1974). Thus, only a few studies considered the history of rewards over time when
investigating the justice process. In most exchange relations in uncontrolled
environments, however, people are involved in long-term repeated investment-reward
sequences (Granovetter 1985). In these situations, each reward event is interdependent
and affects justice evaluations of other rewards. Therefore, the process of justice
evaluations should be understood as evolving through time. Moreover, according to the
research on procedural justice, individuals’ justice evaluations are affected by the fairness
of the decision-making process as well as the results of the decision itself. According to
the argument about procedural justice put forth by Leventhal (1980), consistent
application of rules over time and across people is an important factor in producing
justice evaluations.
Research on negativity bias (Baumeister et al. 2001) and prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) showed how individuals’ judgments are affected by
subjectivity. These theories maintained that a negative event (e.g., loss) is perceived as
stronger than the same magnitude of a positive event (e.g., gain). Justice theory (Adams
1965) also posited an asymmetric effect between under-rewards and over-rewards (Jasso
1980). According to this theory, under-reward has a stronger effect on justice evaluations
than the same amount of over-reward.
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Extending this line of reasoning, I present a theory of reward stability, justice
evaluations and group cooperation. According to this theory, when individuals experience
an unstable reward system in which rewards fluctuate between under-rewards and overrewards though time, they will produce a lower level of justice evaluations than when
they experience repeated stable rewards through time. The theory also postulates that the
resulting lower justice evaluations decrease positive emotions and cooperative behaviors
in groups.
Three empirical studies were conducted as a part of this work, aiming to test the
effectiveness of the theory. The first empirical study was based on a nationally
representative survey from South Korea. In this empirical study, I hypothesized that an
unstable application of rules in workplaces has a negative effect on employees’
willingness to work harder than expected and on their willingness to stay in their
companies despite a better offer. In this empirical study, I analyzed the 2009 KGSS data
using logistic regression. The results revealed that if the employees perceived the rules in
their workplaces as being applied consistently through time, then there was an increase in
their justice evaluations of wages. This perception is also associated with an increase in
employees’ willingness to work hard and stay in their current company.
The second empirical study of this dissertation was a controlled laboratory
experiment with three conditions, which aimed to test the theoretical predictions directly
derived from the theory. In the experiment, the control condition had relatively stable
rewards over time, whereas in the experimental conditions, rewards from the group
fluctuated either mildly (low-instability condition) or severely (high-instability condition).
Results from multi-level models supported the hypotheses that unstable rewards have a
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negative effect on justice evaluations, emotional responses, and behavioral reactions. In
the experiment, the participants who experienced unstable rewards showed significantly
lower justice evaluations and higher distress than those in the stable rewards condition.
The former group also showed a lower level of cooperation, which was measured as level
of investment and wiliness to stay in their current groups.
The results from the experiment also confirm the asymmetric effect between
under-rewards and over-rewards. Based on prospect theory and research on negativity
bias, the current theory assumes that the net effect of unstable rewards on justice
evaluations originates from the asymmetry between under-rewards and over-rewards; the
effect of under-rewards is stronger than the same amount of over-rewards. The results of
the experiment yielded support for this assumption. In addition, the results indicated that
a very small amount of instability in rewards decreases justice evaluations, especially
when the reward is below the expected level. The findings from this experiment are
critical in refining our understanding of the processes by which justice evaluations form
in exchange relations.
Another controlled laboratory experiment was introduced in Chapter 6. The
experiment aimed to replicate and extend the results obtained in the previous experiment.
As this experiment also tested the effect of the presentation order of unstable rewards on
justice evaluations, two competing predictions from the former research were tested. The
primacy effect predicted that unstable rewards that appear at an earlier stage in a reward
sequence have a stronger influence on justice evaluations than those which appear at a
later stage of the reward sequence. On the other hand, the recency effect predicted that
unstable rewards have a stronger effect when received at a later stage.

99

The results of this experiment confirmed the primacy effect of unstable rewards.
Among the experimental conditions, justice evaluations are higher in the recency
conditions than in the primacy conditions. In other words, the unstable rewards at the
starting point of a repeated rewarding sequence linger in individuals’ justice perceptions
stronger than when the unstable rewards appear later. Once unstable rewards lower
individuals’ justice evaluations, the same extent of compensation at a later point in time
cannot cancel the effect of unstable rewards perceived earlier. Regarding the presentation
order between under-rewards and over-rewards, the results revealed that the underreward-first condition resulted in a lower level of justice evaluations that the overreward-first condition.
In the control condition, which did not implement any instability of rewards, the
justice evaluations were higher than the justice evaluations in the other experimental
conditions. This confirmed the results of the former experiment in this dissertation and
demonstrated the effectiveness of the theory yet again. The results also confirmed the
asymmetry in the effects of under-reward and over-reward in their magnitudes and
directions.
This dissertation demonstrates the importance of the stability of rewards in
maintaining justice evaluations and group cooperation. Cooperation among members is
one of the most important features in upholding groups in human society. Thus, many
social scientists examine how to maintain an appropriate level of cooperation in human
society (e.g., Axelrod 1984). Using mixed quantitative methods, this dissertation suggests
that the stability of rewards is one factor which motivates members to cooperate, while
the instability of rewards reduces justice evaluations, positive feelings, and cooperative
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behaviors among individuals, especially when it appears at an early stage of a reward
sequence.
This research has implications beyond sociological theory. Specifically, the study
provides those who determine rewards in formal organizations with empirically validated
knowledge to enhance investment-reward efficiency without the sacrifice of members’
cooperation levels. According to this research, the instability in a reward system itself
increases costs for organizations wishing to maintain group members’ cooperation levels.
For instance, in a company that adopts an unstable system of rewards, levels of
cooperation among employees will be lower than in another company with a stable
system of rewards. Therefore, the first company will either suffer from lower productivity,
or it will expend more resources to maintain a desirable level of productivity among the
employees.
With respect to customer relations and management, researchers have found that
justice evaluations play a key role in shaping customers’ satisfaction levels in the service
recovery process after the customers have experienced a service failure from the
company (e.g., del Río-Lanza et al. 2009). This dissertation suggests that, if the company
wants to raise the damaged satisfaction level among customers after a service failure, the
compensation for the service failure should be greater than the losses resulting from it,
because the negative effect of the service failure will be greater than the positive effect of
the same amount of compensation from the service recovery process. These examples
illustrate that the instability of rewards will cause overall inefficiency in the organization.
This research also promises to aid those who are involved in social policy by
offering the perspective that not only the result of the allocation of resources and burdens
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at one point in time, but also the experiences of the stability of the allocation patterns
over time, is a key factor in establishing justice evaluations regarding social institutions
or government policy among people. Previous research on law compliance showed that
government policies or political authorities depend upon the people’s voluntary
cooperation for their prosperity and that the appearance of fairness is an important
antecedent of cooperation (Tyler 1990, 2010). Findings of the present research
demonstrated that the stability of rewards from a group affect people’s justice evaluations
and willingness to comply with the group.
Many social policies regulate the allocation of burdens and benefits among people
in society. Therefore, changes in social policies will be advantageous to some individuals
and disadvantageous to others. If social policies are changed too frequently, more
individuals will feel that the policies are unfavorable to them and will perceive the
policies or social institutions as unjust. Therefore, governmental policy and social
intuitions need to avoid unnecessary change and should aim for stability, as long as the
stability of social policy does not conflict with the overall social justice.
In summary, this research investigated the role of stability of rewards in groups
and its findings suggest that the instability of rewards itself has a negative effect on
justice evaluations, emotional reactions, and cooperation among group members. This
confirms the importance of reward stability on group cooperation. In addition, the results
reported here suggest that not just the results of an allocation at one time, but also the
history of the allocation of rewards, should be considered in justice research.
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APPENDIX A – KGSS 2008 QUESTIONNAIRE
Demographic Variables
Now I would like to ask about your family members. Please include all family members
who are living in your house and who are temporarily living somewhere else. Answer the
following questions beginning with yourself.
(Write down the person’s relationship to the respondent first, and then ask the person’s
sex, age, marital status, co-residence status, the reason for living elsewhere, employment
status, and the reason for not working. make sure to ask about each and everyone counted
in questions 34, 35 and 36 above.)
1) Relation to respondent
2) Is [PERSON] male or female?
3) How old is [PERSON]?
4) Is [PERSON] now married, widowed, divorced, separated, cohabiting, or never
married?
5) Is [PERSON] living in your house, or is [PERSON] staying somewhere else?
6) (IF [PERSON] IS TEMPORARILY STAYING ELSEWHERE) What is the
primary reason for not living together?

What is the highest level of school you have attended?
0) No formal school

1) Elementary school

2) Junior high school

3) High school

4) Junior college

5) College (Four-year course)

6) Graduate school (Masters)

7) Graduate school (PhD)

Do you work for someone else?
1) Yes

2) No
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Before taxes and other deductions, what is your total monthly average income from this
job? This includes your base pay, bonuses, and other allowances. (If the respondent does
not have a regular monthly income (ex. farmer), then divide the estimated annual income
by 12.

About _____ (10,000) won (88) don’t know

Social Class
In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to
be towards the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top (10) to bottom (1). Where
would you put yourself now on this scale?
_____

Arbitrariness
To what extent do you agree or disagree that the decisions on personnel policy (e.g., pay
and promotions) occur in the following ways in your company?
The decision making is affected by decision makers' prejudices and sentiments.
1) Strongly agree

2) Agree

3) Neither agree nor disagree

4) Disagree

5) Strongly Disagree

The rules and principles of decision making are not consistent.
1) Strongly agree

2) Agree

3) Neither agree nor disagree

4) Disagree

5) Strongly Disagree

Justice Evaluation
Is your pay just? I am not asking about what you do earn, nor what you would like to
earn--but what you feel is just given your skills and effort. If you are not working now,
please tell about your last occupation
1) Much less than is just

2) A little less than is just

3) About just for me

4) A little more than is just

5) Much more than is just
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Willingness to work hard
I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help the firm or organization I work
for succeed.
1) Strongly agree

2) Agree

3) Neither agree nor disagree

4) Disagree

5) Strongly Disagree

Willingness to Stay
I would turn down another job that offered quite a bit more pay in order to stay with this
organization.
1) Strongly agree

2) Agree

3) Neither agree nor disagree

4) Disagree

5) Strongly Disagree
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APPENDIX B – THE RESULTS OF BRANT TEST FOR THE PROPORTIONAL ODDS
ASSUMPTION
Table B.1 Brant Test for Table 4.2 – Model 2
Justice Evaluations

Chi2

p > Chi2

d.f.

All

13.23

.584

15

Age

2.25

.522

3

Education

2.48

.480

3

Income

1.11

.774

3

Social Class

4.95

.176

3

.62

.892

3

No Arbitrariness

Table B.2 Brant Test for Table 4.2 – Model 3
Justice Evaluations

Chi2

p > Chi2

d.f.

All

12.59

.634

15

Age

1.00

.800

3

Education

1.61

.657

3

Income

1.38

.711

3

Social Class

4.42

.219

3

Consistency

.79

.852

3
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Table B.3 Brant Test for Table 4.3 – Model 2
Staying

Chi2

p > Chi2

d.f.

All

39.11

.022

21

Female

3.27

.352

3

Age

1.91

.591

3

Education

1.84

.606

3

Income

1.88

.597

3

Social Class

.31

.312

3

Married

.42

.419

3

2.35

.861

3

No Arbitrariness

Table B.4 Brant Test for Table 4.3 – Model 3
Staying

Chi2

p > Chi2

d.f.

All

39.55

.008

21

Female

3.38

.336

3

Age

2.12

.549

3

Education

2.08

.555

3

Income

1.93

.587

3

Social Class

3.5

.321

3

Married

3.05

.384

3

Consistency

7.18

.066

3
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Table B.5 Brant Test for Table 4.4 – Model 2
Working Hard

Chi2

p > Chi2

d.f.

All

22.36

.379

21

1.23

.745

3

.96

.812

3

Education

2.03

.567

3

Income

2.36

.501

3

11.98

.007

3

2.69

.448

3

.47

.924

3

Female
Age

Social Class
Married
No Arbitrariness

Table B.6 Brant Test for Table 4.3 – Model 3
Working Hard

Chi2

p > Chi2

d.f.

All

22.42

.376

21

1.26

.738

3

.98

.805

3

Education

2.03

.567

3

Income

2.49

.476

3

11.90

.008

3

2.66

.447

3

.64

.886

3

Female
Age

Social Class
Married
Consistency
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APPENDIX C – THE COVER STORY AND THE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE
EXPERIMENTS
Instructions
We are members of a research team of social scientists who are interested in studying
group cooperation. In today’s study, you will belong to a task group. In that group, you
will be randomly assigned to the role of decider (manager) or contributor (programmer)

Let’s assume the following situation: There are freelance computer programmers who are
now working alone. A computer program company finds out that there are demands for a
bunch of new computer programs in the market and the programmers are able to develop
the programs. The company suggest that the programmers develop the new programs
together. It will guarantee better profits to the programmers than if developed and sell the
program by themselves, because the company will advertise and ensure mass distribution.
Thus, the programmers decide to work together in the company.

To develop the programs, the programmers will decide how much time and skill they will
invest in the project. This amount will be represented by “resource unit (RU)” in this
experiment. After they develop each program, the company sells it on the market on
behalf of the programmers. Then the manager of the company will distributed the
revenues on the programmers.

In this study, one group is composed of 4 participants who are randomly assigned to two
different roles: a manger and a programmer. Only one participants will be assigned to the
manager’s role. If you assigned to be a manager, you will not be involved in developing
computer programs. But after each program is developed through the programmers’
investments, the manager will divided the revenue among the programmers according to
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the amount of work they invested in the program. As a manager, you will be informed of
all programmers’ investments levels in the task. Thus, you can use this information in
deciding reward allocations.

The rest of the participants will be assigned to a programmer’s role. If you are assigned to
be a programmer, you are supposed to develop a new program in each session with your
RUs(resource units) which represents your time and skills that are ready to invest. You
will start every session with some initial RUs. After investment, you will get paid from
the participant who is assigned to the manager’s role. You are only able to know about
your own investment and reward information. The other programmer’s level of
investments a rewards will be unknown.

Now, let’s begin with the study with assigning your role. Please wait while the
experimenter is randomly assigning the roles of each participants…. You are assigned to
a programmer’s role. You are programmer 2 (P2).

Let’s talk more about the programmer’s role. Each programmer has 500RUs in each
session that can be invested to develop a new program. The products developed by you
and other programmers will be sold in market by the manager’s effort, and will bring
1.5(150%) times higher revenue to the company. The participant who is assigned to be a
manager is supposed to decide your payment. The company’s payment guideline
recommends that the invested group RUs from the programmers will be multiplied by
1.3(130%) and returned back to the programmers. However, it is the manager who finally
decides programmers’ payments, and your payment can vary according to the manager’s
decision. The rest of the profit: total revenue – programmers’ payment, will be the
payment for the manager.
While the manager has final say over payment amounts from investment, programmers
can decide how much to invest from their RUs. You can keep the RUs not invested in the
group task. The programmers will develop several different programs and will be asked
to decide their investment in each time.
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Importantly, your total RUs will be converted in to real money with at the end of the
experiment and paid to you. That is, you will paid for the RUs that you do not invest and
for your payments from investments throughout the experiment. The RUs you earn from
this experiments will be rounded up to the nearest thousandth and converted to $1 per
1000 RUs. For example, if you earn 6200RUs, you will get $7.

Quizzes (Bolds are the right answers)

How many people are in your group?
1 person

3 people

4 people

5 people

How many programmers are in your group?
1 programmer

3 programmers

4 programmers

5 programmers

You are assigned to be _______.
A manager

A programmer

An experimenter

Neither of them

According to the company’s guidelines, each programmer’s invested RUs will be
multiplied by about ______ times and returned to the programmer.
1.0 times

1.3 times

1.5 times

2.0 times

If you invest in 400RUs to develop the program, how much RUs would you expect to
earn from the company?
360 RUs

400 RUs

520 RUs

600 RUs
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Questionnaire (Each set of questionnaire was administered after each trial)

My Payment form the company were
Very Unjust 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10 Very Just

How angry do you feel about your returns on investments?
Not angry at all 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10 Very angry

How satisfied do you feel about your returns on investments?
Not satisfied at all 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10 Very satisfied

How resentful do you feel about your returns on investments?
Not resentful at all 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10 Very resentful

How disappointed do you feel about your returns on investments?
Not disappointed at all 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10 Very disappointed

If another company were to offer you another position, which is expected to pay a little
more, would you want to switch jobs?
No 1 – 2 – 3 – 4 – 5 – 6 – 7 – 8 – 9 – 10 Yes
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APPENDIX D – MULTI-LEVEL MODEL SELECTION
This appendix presents a series of model specifications which are used for analyses in
chapter 5. The preferred model in each specification is highlighted in gray.
Table D.1 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Justice Evaluations
Justice Evaluations

Chi2

d.f.

478.7

1

< .001

5

491.2

1

< .001

5762.6

8

88.9

3

< .001

5769.0

14

-2LL

# of Parameter

Null Model

6367.4

1

Manipulation

5888.7

2

Condition

6342.7

4

M1 + C 2

5851.5

M + C + M×C
Full Model
1
2

p-value

Manipulation of Rewards
Condition

Table D.2 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Anger
Anger

Chi2

d.f.

583.4

1

< .001

5

606.1

1

< .001

5581.8

8

111.3

3

< .001

5581.9

14

-2LL

# of Parameter

Null Model

6334.7

1

Manipulation

5751.3

2

Condition

6299.2

4

M1 + C 2

5693.1

M + C + M×C
Full Model
1
2

Manipulation of Rewards
Condition
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p-value

Table D.3 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Disappointment
Disappointment

-2LL

# of Parameter

Null Model

6459.5

1

Manipulation

5803.8

2

Condition

6429.5

4

M1 + C 2

5751.6

M + C + M×C
Full Model
1
2

Chi2

d.f.

p-value

655.7

1

< .001

5

677.9

1

< .001

5564.9

8

186.7

3

< .001

5558.1

14

6.8

9

.658

Manipulation of Rewards
Condition

Table D.4 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Resentment
Resentment

-2LL

# of Parameter

Null Model

6267.6

1

Manipulation

5802.5

2

Condition

6250.6

4

M1 + C 2

5777.0

M + C + M×C
Full Model
1
2

Chi2

d.f.

p-value

465.1

1

< .001

5

473.6

1

< .001

5696.4

8

80.6

3

< .001

5690.8

14

5.6

9

.779

Manipulation of Rewards
Condition
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Table D.5 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Satisfaction
Satisfaction

-2LL

# of Parameter

Null Model

6476.5

1

Manipulation

5749.8

2

Condition

6449.5

4

M1 + C 2

5699.9

M + C + M×C
Full Model
1
2

Chi2

d.f.

p-value

726.7

1

< .001

5

749.6

1

< .001

5499.8

8

200.1

3

< .001

5493.5

14

6.3

9

.710

Manipulation of Rewards
Condition

Table D.6 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Investment (with the trial)
Chi2

d.f.

p-value

4

81.5

3

< .001

15513.5

15

63.8

11

< .001

T1 + C 2

15429.6

18

85.9

3

< .001

T + C + T×C

15173.4

60

256.2

42

< .001

Full Model

15103.2

66

70.2

6

< .001

Invest

-2LL

# of Parameter

Null Model

15660.8

1

Condition

15579.3

Trial

1
2

Trial
Condition
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Table D.7 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Staying Behavior
Staying

-2LL

# of Parameter

Null Model

6507.9

1

Manipulation

6360.2

2

Condition

6473.6

4

M1 + C 2

6321.1

M + C + M×C
Full Model
1
2

Chi2

d.f.

p-value

147.7

1

< .001

5

152.5

1

< .001

6280.5

8

40.6

3

< .001

6236.7

14

43.8

9

< .001

Manipulation of Rewards
Condition

Table D.8 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Justice Evaluations
Justice Evaluations

-2LL

# of parameters

Chi2

d.f.

p-value

UN

4823.0

105

Ante(1)

5471.7

27

648.7

78

< .001

AR(1)

5706.0

2

883.0

103

< .001

ARH(1)

5655.4

15

832.4

90

< .001

ARMA(1,1)

5587.0

3

764.0

102

< .001

CS

5587.1

2

764.1

103

< .001

CSH

5533.4

15

710.4

90

< .001

TOEP

5176.4

14

353.4

91

< .001

TOEPH

5371.1

27

548.1

78

< .001

VC

5762.6

1

939.6

104

< .001
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Table D.9 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Anger
Chi2

d.f.

p-value

27

589.5

78

< .001

5484.2

2

900.4

103

< .001

ARH(1)

5287.6

15

703.8

90

< .001

ARMA(1,1)

5330.7

3

746.9

102

< .001

CS

5330.9

2

747.1

103

< .001

CSH

5146.6

15

562.8

90

< .001

TOEP

5164.4

14

580.6

91

< .001

TOEPH

5004.2

27

420.4

78

< .001

VC

5581.8

1

998.0

104

< .001

Anger

-2LL

# of parameters

UN

4583.8

105

Ante(1)

5173.3

AR(1)

Table D.6 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Disappointment
Chi2

d.f.

p-value

27

477.7

78

< .001

5458.0

2

781.0

103

< .001

ARH(1)

5291.7

15

614.7

90

< .001

ARMA(1,1)

5330.3

3

653.3

102

< .001

CS

5337.1

2

660.1

103

< .001

CSH

5188.9

15

511.9

90

< .001

TOEP

5199.3

14

522.3

91

< .001

TOEPH

5062.7

27

385.7

78

< .001

VC

5564.9

1

887.9

104

< .001

Disappointment

-2LL

# of parameters

UN

4677.0

105

Ante(1)

5154.7

AR(1)
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Table D.7 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Resentment
Chi2

d.f.

p-value

27

541.7

78

< .001

5567.4

2

838.9

103

< .001

ARH(1)

5389.2

15

660.7

90

< .001

ARMA(1,1)

5388.9

3

660.4

102

< .001

CS

5389.0

2

660.5

103

< .001

CSH

5217.3

15

488.8

90

< .001

TOEP

5248.7

14

520.2

91

< .001

TOEPH

5092.0

27

363.5

78

< .001

VC

5696.4

1

967.9

104

< .001

Resentment

-2LL

# of parameters

UN

4728.5

105

Ante(1)

5270.2

AR(1)

Table D.8 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Satisfaction
Chi2

d.f.

p-value

27

451.9

78

< .001

5412.4

2

666.7

103

< .001

ARH(1)

5211.5

15

465.8

90

< .001

ARMA(1,1)

5285.7

3

540.0

102

< .001

CS

5286.8

2

541.1

103

< .001

CSH

5211.5

15

465.8

90

< .001

TOEP

5004.0

14

258.3

91

< .001

TOEPH

5138.9

27

393.2

78

< .001

VC

5499.8

1

754.1

104

< .001

Satisfaction

-2LL

# of parameters

UN

4745.7

105

Ante(1)

5197.6

AR(1)
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Table D.9 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Investment
Chi2

d.f.

p-value

27

257.6

78

< .001

14820.2

2

338.5

103

< .001

ARH(1)

14773.4

15

291.7

90

< .001

ARMA(1,1)

14688.7

3

207.0

102

< .001

CS

14724.9

2

243.2

103

< .001

CSH

14686.4

15

204.7

90

< .001

TOEP

14666.2

14

184.5

91

< .001

TOEPH

14624.9

27

143.2

78

< .001

VC

15103.2

1

621.5

104

< .001

Investment

-2LL

# of parameters

UN

14481.7

105

Ante(1)

14739.3

AR(1)

Table D.10 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Staying
Chi2

d.f.

p-value

27

593.2

78

< .001

5703.9

2

791.7

103

< .001

ARH(1)

5634.9

15

722.7

90

< .001

ARMA(1,1)

5426.7

3

514.5

102

< .001

CS

5461.9

2

549.7

103

< .001

CSH

5423.8

15

511.6

90

< .001

TOEP

5353.1

14

440.9

91

< .001

TOEPH

5307.0

27

394.8

78

< .001

VC

6236.7

1

1324.5

104

< .001

Staying

-2LL

# of parameters

UN

4912.2

105

Ante(1)

5505.4

AR(1)
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These present a series of model specifications which are used for analyses in chapter 6.
The preferred model in each specification is highlighted in gray.

Table D.11 Summary of Multi-level Models predicting Justice Evaluations
Justice Evaluations

Chi2

-2LL

# of Parameter

d.f.

p-value

Null Model

10910.8

1

P + R + P×R

10889.4

9

21.4

8

.006

Full

10897.9

15

12.9

14

.534

Table D.12 Specifying Covariance Structure of the Model predicting Justice Evaluations
Chi2

d.f.

p-value

35

578.0

78

< .001

9461.6

2

1070.6

103

< .001

ARH(1)

9303.2

19

912.2

90

< .001

ARMA(1,1)

9453.7

3

1062.7

102

< .001

CS

10794.4

2

2403.4

103

< .001

CSH

10183.8

19

1792.8

90

< .001

TOEP

9300.1

18

909.1

91

< .001

TOEPH

9165.9

35

774.9

78

< .001

10889.4

1

2498.4

104

< .001

Justice Evaluations

-2LL

# of parameters

UN

8391.0

171

Ante(1)

8969.0

AR(1)

VC
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